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Figure 1 (on the cover): Conceptual loop diagram of a coupled 
climate change and social model with accompanying description 




This thesis is about knowledge practices in the development of models of socio-ecological 
transformations as I was able to observe them during the three months of ethnographic research 
I conducted in an interdisciplinary research group. Especially on a global scale, modeling socio-
ecological processes presented an important research boundary for the research group and their 
academic community. This motivated my research in two ways. On the one hand I want focus 
on the production of scientific knowledge, as it has been studied in Science and Technology 
Studies (STS), focusing on how a group of scientists works and thinks together every day as 
well as concomitant social and technoscientific practices of knowledge production. In this 
sense, this work stands in line with classic laboratory studies. On the other hand, I was also 
interested in how ‘the social’ vis-à-vis the environment, as a central target of inquiry in social 
anthropology, is conceptualized and re-produced in modeling practices.  
Subsequently, my initial research question was concerned with how and based on which epis-
temic assumptions decisions are made about what to (not) include in a model: Which implicit 
and explicit theories about the social, society, and human decision-making enter the modeling 
process? What assumptions exist about the environment, nature and the material? And more 
specifically: How are assumptions represented, made explicit and productive throughout the 
process of model construction, e.g. through practices of mapping in causal loop diagrams and 
the subsequent transformation into mathematical models? These questions were anchored on 
three different levels: epistemology, social theory, and its operationalization.  
However, shortly into my field work I realized that there is a gap between the goal of modeling 
socio-ecological processes on a global scale and the work done in the research group at that 
time with several simple, conceptual models of various social, psychological, environmental 
and/ or economic processes. This is why for this thesis I decided to focus less on model content 
and assumptions and more on a general understanding and description of modeling practices 
in the research group as I was able to gain it on the basis of interviews mainly with master and 
PhD-students in the research group, as well as accompanying participant observation.  
Modeling encompasses model construction as well as model runs. Models in this specific con-
text are mathematical models, sets of equations describing certain processes, relationships, in-
teractions and entities. Corresponding computational models are then used to simulate that sys-
tem’s behavior over time, starting from a particular scenario. Additionally, the models appear 
in a number of other ways in everyday practices, e.g. as conceptual diagrams or plots.  
Thus, I will describe practices in model construction as continuous socio-technical and mate-
rial-semiotic practices of alignment of model formats. Because each of these formats is a part 
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of different knowledge-practices, their alignment will not and does not have to be perfect in 
order for the model to work. Rather, it is an ongoing process. 
In particular, I will focus on simplification, experimentation and visualization as such practices 
and how they are related to moments of bifurcations entraining varying degrees of irreversibility 
in modeling, e.g. where decisions about the model structure are being made, some of which 
might be harder to reverse than others. These practices are also practices of “social modeling” 
– e.g. collectively, in a certain institutional context, under pressures of time, or based on under-
lying ontological assumptions. Ultimately, “Social modeling” and “models of the social” are 
related in important ways. To argue that point in my last part, I will take up my initial research 
focus on epistemic assumptions again.  
But first, I will describe the research field in more detail, the modelers as well as their models. 
Then I will briefly spell out the research process and methods before I will frame my project 
within anthropological STS and sketch a material-semiotic perspective on knowledge practices 
to ground my focus on bifurcations and irreversibility in model construction. In the main part I 
will focus on three such practices: simplification, experimentation and visualization. In the last 
part, I will again return to the perspective framing my research and analyze what means for 




2. Research Field 
My research field was an interdisciplinary research group developing ways of modeling socio-
ecological transformations. Their aim was to eventually be able to model these transformations 
on a global scale, bringing together Earth System Analysis, climate models and new methodo-
logical modeling approaches in order to include social processes other than economy. Talking 
about their research motivation in interviews or writing about it in publications, they often re-
ferred to discussions surrounding the Anthropocene and Planetary Boundaries.1 A central the-
oretical perspective was Complex Systems Theory. Complex systems are systems that display 
some sort of emergent behavior on the macro level which is neither centrally organized nor 
predictable from the knowledge about the rules governing the micro-processes, the agents’ in-
teractions (cf. Boccara 2010: 4). Examples for such systems may be ant colonies, agent-based 
models, the brain or the earth’s climate.2 
The group had around 15 members, most of them physicists, but included also a mathematician, 
a sociologist and an economist. The group was co-chaired by two senior scientists, and apart 
from three other post-doctoral researchers consisted mainly of PhD-Students, as well as some 
Master’s students and two undergraduates. Due to the different educational stages and other 
institutional affiliations, some of them were more loosely connected to the research group than 
others. They spent less time at the research institute, contributing to a relatively fluid group 
structure.  
The group developed mostly simple and conceptual models. That means that they were not as 
complicated as Earth System Models or Integrated Assessment Models concerning the number 
of processes included, even though some of them were also global in scale. Several models 
focused more strongly on social dynamics than on socio-ecological transformations, like opin-
ion dynamics in social networks or coalition formation. Furthermore, the modelers explored 
and developed modeling methods and frameworks in various combinations: e.g. agent- based 
                                                 
1 The Anthropocene is a proposal to name our current geological epoch where humanity has become a major 
environmental force on all scales (e.g. Crutzen 2002). Planetary Boundaries (cf. Rockström et al. 2009,  Steffen 
et al. 2015) express how “Humanity is […] overstretching the planet, not primarily by reaching the limits of re-
source availability, but rather by approaching or even transgressing the limits of anthropogenic disturbance ab-
sorption and ecological resilience – what the planet can absorb” (Palsson et al 2013: 6). A central difficulty is to 
determine the beginning of the Anthropocene (see Working Group of the Anthropocene 2018 and Bonneuil/ 
Fressoz 2017 for a critical account of the history of the term and competing imageries, see also Charbonnier 2017 
on genealogies). A recognition of the Anthropocene ensues the need for new modes of interdisciplinary knowledge 
production also in the humanities and social sciences (cf. Palsson et al 2013, Latour 2017a, 2017b, for an assembly 
of various anthropological perspectives see Howe/ Pandian 2016). 
2 The study of complex systems was institutionalized in 1984 with the foundation of the Santa Fe Institute and it 
fascinates researchers from very different disciplines, e.g. in anthropology, it (resp. cybernetics) influenced the 
work of Gregory Bateson (e.g.2014) and Stephen Lansing (e.g. 2006). For an introduction see Mitchell (2011) or 
Holland (2014). See also part 5.1.1. 
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models (ABM),3 co-evolutionary dynamics, approaches from game theory and artificial intel-
ligence focusing on learning processes, simple economic models, multilayer networks or any 
combination thereof.  
In general, they emphasized understanding of the inner workings of a model over comprehen-
siveness or complexity. While I was there, they had just begun to close that gap between simple 
and complex models with the development of a modeling framework building on what had been 
learned through working with the conceptual models. It contained “building blocks” for social, 
economic and ecological processes and entities as well as methods to link these. It was meant 
to be used by the wider scientific community to build models with. 
While the PhD students often developed their own models, undergraduate and master’s students 
mostly worked with already existing models – changing them and experimenting with model 
dynamics on various scales. Working on their individual projects, they were linked through 
supervising relationships, collective papers, shared offices and the weekly team meeting. Most 
of them additionally invested time into the development and testing of the modeling framework. 
Spatially, the group was distributed between two buildings and members often shared offices 
with colleagues from other research groups at their research institute.  
 
3. Research Methods 
While earlier studies of scientific knowledge practices often used “the laboratory” as a field site 
and thus, could rely on the productivity of participant observation (e.g. Latour/ Woolgar 1986, 
Knorr-Cetina 2011, Traweek 1992), the fluidity of the group, its spatial distribution, the use of 
the computer as the main site of model development and the fact that the models did not exist 
as clearly delineated object made another approach necessary.  
Ethnography is a specific way of connecting theory and empirical material during the research 
process but also in the written product (cf. Hirschauer 2008, Ghodsee 2016). As a methodology, 
it encompasses methods of data gathering and data analysis (cf. Madden 2017: 28). This allows 
or even calls for an adaption of methods to the research field, research interest and a certain 
unpredictability of everyday life (cf. Bischoff 2014: 19f). Thus I primarily employed interviews 
to gather data and contextualized these with participant observations. 
                                                 
3 ABMs are models of social processes, for example, where heterogeneous agents interact with neighboring agents 
following simple, local rules ultimately exhibiting some sort of unpredictable emergent phenomenon, e.g. segre-
gation (cf. Schelling 1971): “agent-based models provide computational demonstrations that a given microspeci-
fication is in fact sufficient to generate a macrostructure of interest” (Epstein 1999: 42). These agents do not have 
all the information nor are they perfectly rational. Joshua Epstein was one of the first to develop such models on a 
larger scale (e.g. cf. Epstein/ Axtell 1996). 
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Over the course of almost three months I conducted two group discussions, two unstructured 
and 10 semi-structured interviews (cf. Schlehe 2008, Bernard 2006), each lasting between 45 
and 90 minutes and transcribed word-for-word. Conceiving expertise as a relational status, I 
treated the interviews as expert interviews and prepared my interview guideline accordingly on 
the basis of initial observations, theory and methodological insights (e.g. kinds of questions to 
ask etc., cf. Kaiser 2014, Littig 2008, Powis 2017, Meuser/ Nagel 2009). I included two mental 
maps during the interviews in order to generate text during the interview, but also as visual data 
(a method adapted from urban studies, cf. Helfferich 2014): one of the subjective position 
within the research group and one of the model the person worked with. The fact that most of 
the interviews were with master’s or PhD students of course influences my perception of mod-
eling as a learning process and its description in this thesis.4 
Participant observation (cf. Spradley 2011 [1980]) contextualized these interviews, e.g. in gath-
ering first insights to develop the interview guideline. Most situations I was able to observe 
were supervisions of students and the team meetings. The meetings focused on organizational 
matters as well as content: work in progress and interesting papers were presented. Both kinds 
of situations proved to be very fruitful, but allowed only limited insights into everyday practices 
since they mainly served to discuss either results or problems of modeling. Nonetheless, espe-
cially the supervisions impacted the way I structured this thesis.5 
A third way of gathering data treated the models as artefacts, taking a closer look at the code 
(when available), papers published about the models, visualizations of the models in the mental 
maps, and in plots as well as in conceptual loop diagrams used in presentations/ papers.6  
I conducted my field work in three short cycles, leaving the field in between to gather some 
analytical distance and prepare the next phase. I began my research with three days of partici-
pant observation including two unstructured interviews, a spontaneous group discussion and 
gaining additional access to online platforms used by the team which added another unforeseen 
possibility of data gathering. Based on these initial observations, I finalized my interview guide-
line and returned to the field two weeks later in order to conduct semi-structured interviews, 
                                                 
4 All direct quotes from interviews will be cited with the date and the lines in the transcript (e.g. 23/01/2018, 33-
35). Quotes from my fieldnotes will be marked as such (e.g. fieldnotes, 22/02/2018). For the sake of readability, I 
will forgo para- or non-verbal qualifications in the quotes used here, however, should these bear meaning, I will 
mention it in brackets in the quote concerned (e.g. laughs, lowers voice etc.). 
5 While I already had some experience in conducting interviews, doing participant observation was much more of 
a learning process for me – from focusing my observations to writing jottings and formulating full field notes 
(Emerson et al. 1995) and finally, respectfully managing relationships with my informants between distance and 
proximity. Additionally, the lack of a fixed physical location made participant observation more complicated, so I 
had to search people out and be very intentional about being involved in everyday meetings and activities. 
6 In order to analyze this, the artefacts (visualizations, maps, etc) had to be turned into text through extensive memo 
writing, for which I adapted Adele Clarke’s (2009) suggestions to my needs. 
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and participant observation whenever an opportunity presented itself. Afterwards, I left the field 
for two weeks in order to do a first analysis of my material and identify central themes. These 
became the basis for a workshop where I presented first tentative hypotheses and discussed 
them with the research group.7  
Data analysis consists of a “distillation” and a “fattening” of data (Madden 2017: 149). New 
ways of theorizing empirical material and bifurcating theoretical concepts through data (cf. 
Strathern 2011, see part 4.) hopefully lead to abductive moments of inference in that process. 
Concretely, I approached my data with focused coding (cf. e.g. Charmaz 2006), building on the 
themes I had identified preparing the workshop. I employed various coding strategies in order 
to open up and de-familiarize my data (e.g. in-vivo coding, switching between a focus on emo-
tions, descriptions, processes or binaries, coding with analytical concepts, and coding con-
trasting data, cf. Saldaña 2016).  
This more open-ended process of coding was complemented and contrasted by a focus on what 
Marilyn Strathern has called “ethnographic moments” (Strathern 1999: 3f). These moments 
connect observation and analysis, data gathering and the writing process – they are “moments 
that the analysts cannot shake from their mind, and that continue to generate surprise as they 
are revisited in the light of new materials. They are images that refuse exhaustion.” (Street/ 
Copeman 2014: 25). These moments inspired the three longer stories introducing each section 
in the main part of this thesis. For these, I created two personae out of the different people I 
talked to, a student and their supervisor. First, because creating more than one persona allows 
me to capture model construction as a collective learning process and the importance of skill 
and expertise gained in years of practical experience.8 Secondly, the stories are a means of 
anonymizing because in them I fused several situations together (cf. Markham 2012). The stu-
dent could be BA, MA or PhD, the PhD supervisor, Post-Doc researcher or team leader, de-
pending on the situation. The model in these stories is a model of opinion dynamics in social 
networks, and bears some resemblance to a model in the field. 
                                                 
7 Both my supervisors actively participated in that workshop and its preparation, which led to very lively discus-
sion. 
8 “The need to study skill comes from the fact that, while technological mediation ensures the global dissemination 
of standards, professional apprenticeship still constructs knowledge locally by training expert practitioners.” 
(Grasseni 2007:10). Even though this is not a phenomenologically oriented work, with this point I reference a 
notion of  “educating attention” and “enskillment” involving all senses and personal apprenticeship as they were 
developed by Tim Ingold (2008), for example (cf. ibid: 8, see also footnote 52 on “skilled vision”). I will neglect 
an account of experience at this point but recognize its necessity for further research.   
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Another central aspect of anthropological research I already hinted at with the connectedness 
of empirical data and theory is a twofold concern with reflexivity. First, doing and writing eth-
nography confronts my own assumptions and concepts. Thinking through the empirical mate-
rial always changes anthropological thought, too: 
Ethnography in its most daring undertakings (and as formulated from its very beginnings) has 
always been about the uncomfortably transformative mediated immediacy of the encounter, an 
encounter designed – however often it is diverted from that end – to bring us one step closer to 
an other’s ontologized world (or worlded ontology) and one step further from our own –be that 
other an interpreting human or a sieving machine, a parasite or a meteorite, Maxwell’s demon 
or Bayes’ equation. (Kockelman 2013: 58) 
Secondly, doing and writing ethnography means to be attentive to the conditions of anthropo-
logical research and in recognition of how what we do and write feeds back into and affects the 
world (cf. Law/ Urry 2011, Mol 2002). 
However, one question concerning this encounter with models and a modeler’s ontologized 
world remained. While ethnographic fieldwork usually implies a certain unfamiliarity with the 
practices, logics, discourses and experiences which provides a productive distance (cf. Hir-
schauer/ Amann 1997), in a highly specialized field such as this I kept and keep wondering how 
much I would have to master of the knowledge produced, the mathematics used, and the code 
written by my informants in order to make sense of what was happening in the everyday. Would 
a certain “interactional expertise” gained through the encounter be enough (cf. Collins/ Evans 
2002)? For this master’s thesis I think it sufficed. However, for future extended or collaborative 
future research, the question remains open. 
 
4. Research Perspective 
This work draws on literature from anthropology and Science and Technology Studies, as well 
as converging literature from the neighboring disciplines of philosophy and history of science. 
However, at this point I will not give a review of the literature but instead go into more detailed 
discussions when it is pertinent to my argument in the main part.9 Here, I want to outline my 
research perspective and the gap this thesis begins to close. 
Whereas a substantial amount of work has been done on physical models, especially climate 
models (Edwards 2013, Heymann et al. 2017, Hastrup/ Skrydstrup 2013, Guillemot 2007, 
                                                 
9 Central lines of inquiry that became relevant are: collective aspects of modeling in a research group situating 
knowledge practices socially and historically (see part 5.1.1.), the value of simplifications for models as mediators 
(part 5.1.2.), the epistemic novelty of computer simulations (part 5.2.2) and finally the role of materiality when 
comparing laboratory experiments and computer experiments in relation to their epistemic value (5.2.3.). 
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2010a, 2010b, Sundberg 2005, 2010, 2016), few studies in social anthropology/ STS focus di-
rectly on knowledge practices in the modeling of socio-ecological transformations.10 This con-
stitutes my research gap in a very straightforward way.  
A number of these empirical studies on various models have focused on individual steps in 
model construction, partly corresponding to the steps I follow in this account. Some of the steps 
may seem deeply generic. After all, what discipline does not do a literature review in order to 
narrow down a research question (see part 5.1.)? Which models are not used for experimenta-
tion and parameter runs (see part 5.2.)? And are visualizations and images not abundant in many 
other areas (see part 5.3.)? Of course, the point of this thesis is not to say that modelers perform 
parameter runs, for example. Rather, the point is to describe and theorize where, when, why 
and how they do this. In this specific research group, a modeler performs a bigger number of 
parameter runs with a model of a certain socio-ecological process on the research institute’s 
central computer when the model structure is mostly clear – indicating a moment of closure in 
model development. Modeling a “complex system”, she does this to identify parameter values 
where bifurcations happen – qualitative changes in model behavior – which she will then dis-
cuss with the whole research group.  
The example illustrates, how modeling practices are situated – in a place as well as in a collec-
tive, materially as well as theoretically. Accounting for the situatedness of scientific practices 
and the implications for the resulting knowledge has been a central insight from anthropological 
STS (e.g. through laboratory studies, for a recent summary see Liburkina/ Niewöhner 2017) 
within which in turn this thesis is situated.  
Another insight on which I build upon is a conceptualization of knowledge and knowledge 
production – through the construction and manipulation of a model – not just as situated, but as 
a material-semiotic practice. Originating in feminist science studies, material semiotics now 
covers a broad and diverse range of approaches ranging from Actor Network Theory (for an 
overview see Law 2011) to posthumanist feminism (cf. Haraway 1991) and the new material-
isms (cf. Van der Tuin/ Dolphijn 2012, Barad 1996, 2003, 2012).11 Material Semiotics attend 
to the entanglements of matter and meaning in practice and discourse: 
                                                 
10 The work of Catharina Landström and colleagues with and on a participatory project of flood risk modeling 
could be read as such (cf. e.g. Landström et al 2011, Landström/ Whatmore 2014).  
11 First, there was a “diagnosis” of a hybrid situation, e.g. with the notion of the cyborg (cf. Haraway 1991) which 
was, taken up and developed by Latour (2015 [1991]). This was a response to various “turns” leading to a social 
constructivism unable to deal with materiality, or dealing with materiality only in one way, conceiving it as fully 
social: “Language has been granted too much power. The linguistic turn, the semiotic turn, the interpretative turn, 
the cultural turn: it seems that at every turn lately every ‘thing’ – even materiality – is turned into a matter of 
language or some other form of cultural representation. The ubiquitous puns on “matter” do not, alas, mark a 
rethinking of the key concepts (materiality and signification) and the relationship between them. […]. Language 
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Discursive practices and material phenomena do not stand in a relationship of externality to one 
another; rather, the material and the discursive are mutually implicated […]. But nor are they 
reducible to one another. The relationship between the material and the discursive is one of 
mutual entailment. Neither is articulated/articulable in the absence of the other; matter and 
meaning are mutually articulated. Neither discursive practices nor material phenomena are on-
tologically or epistemologically prior. Neither can be explained in terms of the other. Neither 
has privileged status in determining the other. (Barad 2003: 821) 
Donna Haraway first coined the “unwieldy” term “material-semiotic actor” to “portray the ob-
ject of knowledge as an active, meaning-generating part” (Haraway 1988: 595) in processes of 
knowledge production in order to accommodate contingency of knowledge, reflexivity con-
cerning one’s own knowledge practices and “a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts 
of a ‘real’ world” (ibid: 579) .12 Consequently, agency is distributed between human or non-
human material-semiotic actors, constraining or enabling each other e.g. in making decisions 
about which processes to include in a model.13 One example of this, to link this back to the field 
of laboratory studies, are experimental systems in the laboratory and related practices, e.g. 
translation and inscription (Latour/ Woolgar 1986). They are not just tools or “carriers of mean-
ing”, but independent actors in the construction of scientific facts (cf. Liburkina/ Niewöhner 
2017: 183). 
Models, like other experimental systems and knowledge, as “epistemic tools” (Knuuttila 2011: 
263) are thus products of and actors in material-semiotic practices. Accounts of model episte-
mology need to take the not necessarily human (cf. Humphreys 2009), distributed “interpreting 
agent” (Kockelmann 2017: 180), into account (see part 5.2.1.). 
Barad stresses the openended-ness of these practices whose outcome is “neither a matter of 
strict determinism nor unconstrained freedom. The future is radically open at every turn” (Barad 
2003: 826). 14 Thus, decisions made in model development – be they pragmatic or after thought-
ful considerations – bring with them a host of new possibilities, but also exclude others. Align-
ment is an ongoing achievement. 
                                                 
matters. Discourse matters. Culture matters. There is an important sense in which the only thing that does not seem 
to matter anymore is matter” (Barad 2003: 802). 
12 Her case is the body as object of knowledge in biology and in feminist theory. She does not want to “loose the 
body” in a separation of sex and gender privileging either biological determinism or its social construction and 
extends this to social studies of science: “The same problem of loss attends the radical ‘reduction’ of the objects 
of physics or of any other science to the ephemera of discursive production and social construction” (Haraway 
1988: 591f). 
13 The various material-semiotic approaches differ in whether it is symmetrically or asymmetrically distributed. 
14 Thus, several accounts of material-semiotics include ethics, as I have already hinted at in relation to reflexivity 
in research in part 3. Haraway (1988) appeals to feminists’ responsibility for a better world and Mol (1999) calls 
our attention to ontological politics. Barad develops an “Ethico-epistemo-onto-logy” (Barad 2012: 100) with a 
stronger processual focus: “The ethical significance of agential realism, therefore, is not just in extending the idea 
that things ‘could have been otherwise’ to the ontological realm, but in conceptualizing the precise moments at 
which things congeal ‘as they are’ by understanding the processes through which particular material properties 
emerge and other realities are excluded from being.” (Hollin et al. 2017). 
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I want to use the image of a bifurcation to illustrate this. “Bifurcation” as metaphor bridges 
modeling and anthropology. In physics, a bifurcation is defined as “a qualitative change in a 
family of vector fields, which depends on a finite number of parameters” (Boccara 2010: 85) 
and describes the point of change between two qualitatively different behaviors of the same 
model:  
A model whose qualitative properties do not change significantly when it is subjected to small 
perturbations is said to be structurally stable. Since a model is not a precise description of a 
system, qualitative predictions should not be altered by slight modifications. Satisfactory mod-
els should be structurally stable. (ibid: 32) 
In the research group, performing a “bifurcation analysis” on a model to pinpoint these mo-
ments of change was quite common.  
In anthropology, Marilyn Strathern introduced bifurcation as a way of working with concepts 
in order to generate better descriptions instead of more and more meta-theories removed further 
and further from the object of study: 
I dwell instead on the point of bifurcation, the moment of division, which need not take a binary 
form but very often does. It is the moment at which a distinction between terms could lead 
analysis down different routes. [...] [A] distinction between terms also maintains them in rela-
tion: they can still be found in one another’s company, to be repeated, at any juncture, later. We 
can repeatedly bring ourselves back to the point from which we started. In short, distinctions 
can keep terms from dissipating. (Strathern 2011: 90)15 
This means that terms acquire meaning in relation and tension to other terms (cf. Ballestero 
forthcoming: 9), not in and of themselves. Bifurcations are differentiations to avoid working 
only with pre-existing categories (cf. Street/ Copeman 2014: 12). It means developing concepts 
out of the gap between language of analysis and object of study, or theory and description, 
which “establish unintuitive juxtapositions between newly differentiated things. These ‘things’ 
are neither objects nor theories because theories in this mode of knowledge production remain 
firmly attached to their objects […].” (ibid: 17). This is precisely what I attempt to do with the 
concept of “bifurcation” in this work.  
Whereas Strathern focuses on the value of bifurcations in anthropological theorizing, Andrea 
Ballestero asks empirically “how people create bifurcations amidst the intense relationality of 
word, measurement and matter” (Ballestero forthcoming: 17) and characterizes them as unsta-
ble and temporary, even contradictory (cf. ibid: 30). 
                                                 
15 Bifurcating is not separating, and is not working with opposites or dualisms, “a binary move simply allows an 




To sum this up: A metaphorical use of bifurcation in the physics’ sense emphasizes how at a 
bifurcation something becomes something else. On a more reflexive level, Strathern’s concep-
tualization asks me to inquire in what ways bifurcating concepts could further anthropological 
theorizing and generate better descriptions of modeling. And following Ballestero, it becomes 
a method and an empirical question: Where are bifurcations produced in the modeling process 
through practices of alignment? What are the specific material-semiotic practices at such mo-
ments? And are some of them more crucial, stable and difficult to reverse than others?16  
While I will be able to indicate some potential bifurcations, I will not be able to answer these 
questions in full in this thesis. Writing about and looking for bifurcations is a frame, a method-
ological focus which allows me to attend to moments of differentiation rather than continuities 
produced in material-semiotic practices.17 The following is an account of such practices as 
practices of alignment. 
  
                                                 
16 Relating to this last question, “degrees of irreversibility” (Callon 1990) will be introduced in the following part. 
17 I will return to this as a frame again in part 6. 
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5. Practices of Alignment in Model Development 
My aim for this thesis is to develop a basic understanding of modeling from an anthropological 
perspective on knowledge practices through the focus on bifurcations in model development 
and the material-semiotic practices at these moments. This main part is divided into three sec-
tions, focusing on one particular modeling practice: simplification (5.1.), experimentation (5.2.) 
and visualization (5.3.). Each section begins with a short, introductory story of student devel-
oping a model, followed by two parts that correspond to the steps in model development as laid 
out above: Finding a research interest (5.1.1.), identifying basic processes in the system in ques-
tion (5.1.2.), systematically assembling the model (5.2.1.), letting the model run multiple times 
(5.2.2.), observing interesting phenomena emerging within the model (5.3.1.), and looking for 
similarities between the model output and its target system (5.3.2.). With each step, I am going 
to delve a little bit further into one particular principle or practice of model development as it 
was made explicit by the modelers and contrast or elaborate it with insights from STS. 
My thesis is that model development can be described as a process of iteratively and continu-
ously aligning model formats – mathematical model, computational model, etc. - through prac-
tices of simplification, experimentation and visualization. This alignment takes work and the 
different formats still never align completely – and they do not have to in order for the model 
to work. Each of these formats sets slightly different accents, is a part of different knowledge 
practices and needs as well as explains the others. This means that this work is less about the 
model as a final product, and more about the process of model construction where at different 
points the model becomes more and more final in the sense that it becomes more difficult to 
change in its basic structure. 
With “model format” I want to capture the different ways in which “the model” is enacted in 
various practices. Talking about “the model” is, in fact, a simplification on my part. Especially 
at the beginning of my project I grappled with pinning down “the models”. Soon I learned that 
models exist in a variety of ways and forms: most obviously, as mathematical equations and 
computer code, but also as visualizations, plots of model output, descriptive text in a paper 
about the model and as the modelers’ mental models, which I elicited with the mental maps in 
the interviews. I take the notion of “format” from philosopher of science Marion Vorms’ elab-
oration on how formats of model presentation matter for theorizing in scientific practices, spe-
cifically for inferences made by particular model users with particular epistemic interests and 
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skills.18 With this she moves beyond discussions about the representational relationship be-
tween model and target system to a relational account of format, model user and inference:  
Therefore, the notion of format is fundamentally dynamical in character; the format of a repre-
sentation has to be defined (beside the perceptual properties of the representation and a minimal 
set of construction and interpretation rules) in reference to a particular situation, involving a 
particular agent, with particular skills, theoretical commitments, preferences, reasoning habits, 
as well as interests and intentions in the particular inquiry in which he is involved. (Vorms 2012: 
267f) 
Whereas she focuses on visual and spatial aspects of diagrams, tables and equations, I will also 
include mental models and computer code. Especially for that last format the material af-
fordances of the technologies employed will become relevant as well, e.g. computing power 
and programming languages (see part 5.2.).  
I want to illustrate alignment with the 
metaphor of the telescope or binoculars. One 
of the modelers used it in a mental map to 
illustrate how each modeler only sees parts 
of the world they then translate into a model. 
I use it as metaphor for the model. Like 
lenses in the telescope, the different model 
formats have to be attuned to each other in 
order for the modeler to see through it and to 
work with it (I will get back to the notion of 
the model as a tool in part 5.2.1.).  
Alignment was conceptualized within the framework of Actor Network Theory (ANT). Michel 
Callon (1990) proposes a set of analytical tools to analyze techno-economic networks in order 
to understand how these networks evolve – how heterogeneous or even incommensurable ele-
ments are made to work together, sometimes irreversibly. Alignment describes the successful 
outcome of such a process, which  
generates a shared space, equivalence and commensurability. It aligns […]. When there is 'per-
fect translation', A and B speak in exactly the same way about themselves, about one another, 
and about the intermediary that links them together. There is total equivalence with no ambigu-
ity. (Callon 1990: 145, emphasis in the original)  
Concretely, model formats are aligned with each other to become “the model”. But contrary to 
Callon, I stress that model formats never align completely and do work of their own accord 
because they are bound up in different knowledge practices. In modeling, they act upon each 
                                                 
18 Her main examples are different equations describing a certain problem in classical mechanics. 
Figure 2: Mental map of the research group (31/01/2018). Re-
produced with permission. 
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other and the modeler, which in turn causes iterations and feedbacks. Thus, alignment is a con-
tinuous achievement, it takes work (cf. ibid: 148).  
Some translations or alignments are more stable than others, their “degree of irreversibility”19 
depending on “(a) the extent to which it is subsequently impossible to go back to a point where 
the translation was only one amongst others and (b) the extent to which it shapes and determines 
subsequent translations” (ibid: 149f).20 Bifurcations in model development may therefore en-
train different degrees of irreversibility, something I will highlight whenever possible. 
Despite the iterations mentioned above, the outline of the following parts follows a quote where 
one of the modelers sets out the main steps of model development in an ideal, linear sequence: 
At first I identify a system I am interested in. And then I consider… or, then you investigate 
[…]: what are the basic processes happening in such a system. […]. And then you think about, 
ok, how can I approach this systematically? […] And little by little you assemble the model, 
turn certain effects off, and you let it run again and again and then at first you try to observe 
interesting emergent phenomena. And in the end, ideally, you are able to observe structures that 
you can also observe in the system you really want to study. And then you check, whether the 
model you built describes in any way what you are seeing there. (31/01/2018, 60-73) 
Towards the end of the same interview it became clear that an iterative, playful, creative, trial-
and-error approach is much more central to model development than this initial quote would 
lead me to believe. Interestingly, this is introduced as an ideal in itself, a principle of model 
development at the end of the same interview, after the modeler had demonstrated the imple-
mentation of a new idea: 
This is still very improvised. But it’s basically a first playful approach. 
I: But isn’t this playing around important? 
Exactly (with emphasis), yes, it is. But of course, this is the way of working we have learned 
that is central to physics. To approach such questions conceptually and then simply try stuff out 
and iterate and adapt it until it converges to a point where you can say, ok this is a model that is 
still generic enough but also possible to interpret without having to build too many bridges. 
(31/01/2018, 486-595) 
In general, the process of model construction oscillates between a linear sequence of steps and 
an iterative, looping repetition of a few steps at particular moments of misalignment. Thus, 
iteration can be understood as linking the practices I will focus on in the following. 
                                                 
19 Differentiating “degrees” implies that reversibility is, in principle, still possible (cf. Callon 1990: 159). Ulti-
mately, unidentified, high degrees of irreversibility could potentially lead to lock-in’s in model development as 
Marisa Beck and Tobias Krueger warn concerning the lack of research into the social-scientific coproduction of 
Integrated Assessment Models (cf. Beck/ Krueger 2016: 638). 
20 For Callon, alignment is a result of translation. Translation means that “A defines B” (Callon 1990: 143) and in 
the framework of Actor Network Theory every entity A is the result of previous chains of translations inscribed in 
different material media, texts, publications, skills, technical objects etc (cf. ibid). Like the practices I explore her, 
translation could also be understood as a practice of alignment. In ANT it is a far more general concept of relating 
heterogeneous actors (cf. Schulz-Schaeffer 2017: 276f), which is why Callon (1984) first named ANT a “Sociol-
ogy of Translation”. Translation and inscription are central concepts in ANT, esp. in laboratory studies where they 




When the student decided to do his next project with this research group, he had already 
been working with another group at the research institute for other projects. He decided 
to change groups because this research group was closer to his personal and scientific 
interests. The idea for the model he would base his thesis on originated from his supervisor. 
Given current debates, he was interested in digital social networks and opinion dynamics.  
With this, the type of model was more or less 
decided. It would be a network, where the 
nodes, or agents, stood for people linked 
through “friendships” in a digital social net-
work. Over the course of the following weeks, 
research question and model structure devel-
oped hand-in-hand. That digitalization 
brought with it deep changes in opinion dy-
namics seemed almost self-evident to the stu-
dent. But to pinpoint what concretely had 
changed turned out to be more difficult than 
he had anticipated. So, he did extensive litera-
ture research and looked at already existing models, trying to figure out what had not been 
done yet and whether he could adapt one of those models. Because the model subject had 
little to do with physics and more with the social sciences, he read a lot of social science 
literature, too, something which required a different way of reading: “reading the social 
science stuff was super interesting. That is definitely something one could pick up, to learn 
that it is not about being right or wrong, but that two opinions can be discussed next to 
each other. And one doesn’t necessarily have to be wrong. It’s just that I have to pick the 
one I like better“, he explained with a laugh.  
Still, it was very difficult to decide what he wanted to focus on, and to identify the relevant 
processes. Soon he had an idea, a hunch, but at first he dismissed it. After some more 
reading, he decided to develop his own model based on that original idea: “I felt like doing 
something that hadn’t been done before and none of the existing models really fit – even 
though they were really beautiful. Then I remembered what I had thought about before 
which actually seemed to be relevant now.”   
But even after that, decisions about other processes and the agents' characteristics were 
not easily made, leading to more research and the decision to follow the “mainstream” in 
Figure 3: Extract from a mental map of a model 
(06/02/2018). Reproduced with permission. 
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the social science literature: “I had been researching the issue for a really long time and 
a lot had already happened in the area. There are different approaches with either contin-
uous or discrete opinions. You know, where you have a set number of possible opinions 
and not a range with an infinite number of possibilities? It was quite difficult, but after a 
while I decided to use continuous opinions because I felt that most social scientists worked 
with that. After all, I as a physicist am working on something from the social sciences. And 
discrete opinions are often used for mathematical-analytical descriptions.” 
 
5.1.1. “At first I identify a system I am interested in”. 
In this part, I will situate the “I” that defines a research interest and narrows down a research 
question within the disciplinary perspective and the collective practice of the research group. 
Defining a research interest could be motivated by personal interest as the title of this part in-
dicates or by current societal discourse, as in the introductory scene. Another fundamental 
choice and bifurcation in this stage of modeling was the one between the modification of an 
existing model and the development of a new model, which I will elaborate on now. I will focus 
explicitly on simplification in the following part on literature research. 
The reasons for working with an existing model vary: Existing models are broadly accepted in 
the academic community, they help to test a modeling framework, and they have an educational 
purpose as a more manageable task for undergraduate students. Still, the very first day I spent 
with the research group, they discussed that using an existing model means to adopt simplifi-
cations made by other researchers and contingencies coming out of other development contexts. 
The models developed in the group that had been used by several generations of researchers 
were a connecting element, generating, solidifying and transmitting ideas bigger than the indi-
vidual researcher involved at a specific time. They modified and were modified. When existing 
models were used for undergraduate students or graduate students to learn through working 
with it, they shaped that learning process. Simultaneously, the students gained insights that 
could enhance already established models. While people flowed through the group, as sedi-
ments of collective efforts, the models stayed and connected the group across time. Published 
as open source code and in scientific papers (e.g. Earth System Dynamics, Nature Climate 
Change, Physical Review), the models represented the research group to a bigger scientific 
community. 
In studies of scientific practices, collectivity has been a central issue from the very beginning. 
Already in 1935, the microbiologist, immunologist and philosopher Ludwik Fleck developed 
the idea of a “though collective” sharing a “thought style” on the empirical basis of observing 
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the development of a new test for syphilis. The concepts grasp the interlacing of collectivity 
and knowledge. He introduces them with the following observation: 
Such historical and stylized relations with knowledge show that an interaction exists between 
that which is known and the act of cognition. What is already known influences the particular 
method of cognition; and cognition, in turn, enlarges, renews, and gives fresh meaning to what 
is already known. Cognition is therefore not an individual process […]. Rather it is the result of 
a social activity, since the existing stock of knowledge exceeds the range available to any one 
individual. (Fleck 2008 [1935]: 38) 
He then turns this into an empirical research program: “the three factors involved in cognition 
– the individual, the collective, and objective reality (that which is to be known) – do not signify 
metaphysical entities; these too can be investigated” (ibid: 40) 
This use of already existing models illustrates how the research group can be understood as a 
thought collective and how modeling is not independent of specific thought styles. Extending 
the original concept, the research group as a thought collective is made up by people as well as 
models.21 Thought styles do not just extend synchronically across a group, but they also relate 
researchers diachronically (cf. ibid: 39). As such, the thought collective of the research group 
is situated in a history of thinking about systems from world systems and cybernetics to com-
plex systems. This is entangled with histories of certain types of modeling techniques and tech-
nologies (e.g. computer simulations, see part 5.2.1.).22 
An early example of accounting for collectivity in modeling is Brian Bloomfield’s (1986) work 
on the beginnings of world system models in the 1970s at the Santa Fe Institute and implicit 
theories of the behavior of social system. Influenced by the sociology of knowledge at the time 
(the Strong Programme, e.g. Bloor 1991 [1976]), he focuses on the social construction of sys-
tem dynamics, dedicating the main part to the cosmology of modeling. 
Simon Shackley, a biologist and social scientist working on the sociology of climate change, 
also focuses on the social embeddedness of modeling. Having worked at three different climate 
modeling centers, he distinguishes two “ideal-types” of climate modeler's “epistemic life-
styles”23 that situate modeling strategies, decisions and assumptions affecting model output 
more or less decisively: climate seers and climate constructors.  
                                                 
21 See Latour (2015: 11) for an extension of the notion of the collective beyond human actors. 
22 I will not go into detail but see e.g. Weart (2010), Edwards (2013) on the development of Global Circulation 
Models,  Gießmann (2008) on graph theory and network visualization, Kunnttila/ Loettgers (2012) on  the Lotka-
Volterra Model that served as a computational template (see below) for further modeling efforts esp. for non-linear 
dynamics,  Galison (1996) for the Monte Carlo Method and the works of historian Amy Dahan-Dalmedico (2001, 
2010a, 2010b) on the development of climate and earth system modeling. 
23 “By epistemic lifestyle I mean the set of intellectual questions and problems, and the accompanying set of 
practices, that provide a sense of purpose, achievement, and ambition to a scientist's work life […]. Additionally, 
an epistemic lifestyle includes the social networks and connections through which scientists organize their indi-
vidual and collective work. [...]. The factors that give rise to different sorts of epistemic lifestyles include many of 
those identified in sociology of science: disciplinary concerns and practices; institutional culture, structures, and 
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The main difference between these two lifestyles consists in their take on model complexity. 
Climate constructors aim at building a comprehensive, complex model of the climate system 
irrespective of a specific application for its own sake. Climate seers use models as tools for 
specific applications and emphasize the importance to understand and predict changing pro-
cesses in the climate system (cf. Shackley 2001: 114- 116).24 Concerning model construction, 
the latter focus on understanding model processes before adding components which make the 
model more complex:  
Seers tend to be more cautious about changing a model that ‘works’ and is reliable. An incre-
mental reductionist strategy is adopted in changing the model, with the influence of each model 
component analyzed separately. Only after the model is well understood is it appropriate (in the 
climate seers' opinion) to add complexity. Additional elements of complexity are then added 
one at a time, and their implications for the rest of the model are analyzed. (ibid: 119) 
I observed a comparable attitude toward models in the research group. They stressed repeatedly 
how important it is to understand what is happening inside their models, e.g. how the different 
parameters and processes influence each other. This was often expressed in opposition to build-
ing models that aim to be realistic or predictive but become too complex and complicated in 
the process, so that it becomes impossible to say which parameter change is responsible for 
which change in model output.25 They defended that position within their academic community 
and it was an important part of the way they defined their work and themselves.26  
Other studies echoing Knorr-Cetina’s comparative analysis of (2011) epistemic cultures in par-
ticle physics and molecular biology also illustrate the importance to consider models, modelers 
and their practices situated within their research group, institution and discipline to understand 
how this frames modeling decisions and knowledge.27  
                                                 
processes; policy and ‘user’ relationships and support; funding sources; peer-group concerns; career trajectories; 
and so on. […]. Such lifestyles are, of course, only ‘ideal types’, evident to different degrees in any individual 
modeler or organization” (Shackley 2001: 114f). 
24 For Shackley, the recognition of epistemic lifestyles serves to understand the diversity of scientific practice, 
especially in dealing with uncertainties in climate modeling. He concludes that transparency about this could 
preemptively deal with critics of climate change that try to play e.g. “climate constructors” off against “climate 
seers” (cf. ibid: 130-131) 
25 This ultimately leads to a form of confirmation holism: “We have argued that complex simulation models in 
general, and climate models in particular, are – due to fuzzy modularity, kludging, and generative entrenchment –   
the products of their contingent respective histories. [...] As such, climate models are analytically impenetrable in 
the sense that we […] are likely to be unable to attribute the various sources of their successes and failures to their 
internal modeling assumptions. Climate models in particular, and complex models in general, exhibit a form of 
confirmation holism.” (Lenhard/ Winsberg 2010: 261)  
26 Dahan-Dalmédico (2001) mentions how the difference between simplified models for understanding and com-
prehensive models for prediction is at the heart of computational physical modeling since its beginnings. 
27 Heymann, Gramelsberger and Mahony characterize “cultures of prediction” in atmospheric modeling by the 
“social role of prediction, significance of computational practices, domestication of uncertainty, institutionaliza-
tion and cultural impact” (Heymann et al. 2017: 18-36). Putting a technological development center stage, Mikaela 
Sundberg follows Turkle (1997) and contrasts “cultures of calculation” and “cultures of simulation” as collective 
ways of relating to computer simulations in order to better understand their use in modeling practices. While cul-
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When a modeler decided to develop a new model, and the research question was clear before-
hand, it could determine the model structure, as one of them remembered: “The process was 
that I already knew what the model was supposed to do in the end”. Enumerating the four 
components of his model he mused: “I don’t know whether the rough structure could have been 
any different. I think that that was predetermined through my expectations and through me 
wanting to keep it as simple as possible” (01/02/2018, 124, 180-183). His colleague seconded 
that “If you begin to model something you already have something. You have a certain research 
question and that already structures a lot of the model, the variables, the processes to include 
and those you neglect” (16/01/2018a, 234-237). 
Alternatively, narrowing down the research question can go hand in hand with developing the 
basic model structure in a more iterative process as it happened in the introductory example. 
However, even a new model may involve already existing “building blocks”, or “computational 
templates” (Humphreys 2004). These “are genuinely cross-disciplinary computational devices, 
such as functions, sets of equations and computational methods, which can be applied to differ-
ent problems in various domains.” (Knuuttila/ Loettgers 2012: 3). For example, when writing 
in the programming language Python, the modelers use so called “Python Packages”.28 In their 
recount of the history of the Lotka-Volterra Model29 becoming such a template e.g. for non-
linear-dynamics, Knuuttila and Loettgers emphasize how the use of these templates leads to a 
productive tension: 
Consequently, there seems to be a tension inherent in the modeling practice that is due to scien-
tists' aim to depict the basic mechanisms underlying some specific phenomena in a certain do-
main and the general cross-disciplinary templates used in this task. This tension, we suggest, is 
a central driving force of modeling practice being productive in different ways. (Ibid: 5)  
How the mentioned underlying mechanisms and phenomena are identified is the topic of the 
following part. 
 
5.1.2. “Then you investigate […]: what are the basic processes happening in such a system?” 
Taking “then you investigate” as my cue first, I will briefly describe this investigation before I 
will focus on “basic processes” and elaborate on simplification as a practice of alignment. 
                                                 
tures of calculation are characterized by a more serious attitude towards modeling, an in-depth focus on mathe-
matical models, write the model code themselves and focus on the simulation of reasonable scenarios, cultures of 
simulations tend to use existing computer programs, show a more playful attitude in exploring model simulations 
and focus on extreme, yet interesting model scenarios. Operationalizing these cultures she employs a set of dichot-
omies – surface/ depth, play/ seriousness, extreme/ reasonable – to analyze typical activities and situations of 
modeling in meteorology and astrophysics. She shows how these cultures manifest side by side and relative to 
specific situations rather than as clear cut collectives. 
28 Python Packages are a way of organizing modules of code that serve a specific purpose, e.g. scientific program-
ming, and can be used across different applications in order to limit the amount of code one has to write oneself.  
29 The Lotka-Volterra Model is a model of predator-prey dynamics in biology. 
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The main “site of investigation” was the existing literature, inside and outside of physics.30 As 
a bifurcation, the choice of literature brings with it certain degrees of irreversibility when it is 
guided by what is already used in a research group and builds on collective experience and skill 
in modeling. Using tried and tested elements out of the literature is also a matter of feasibility. 
This investigation happened iteratively together with the development of the research question 
and the model structure. However, knowledge gaps concerning social processes had to be dealt 
with through the review of literature outside of physics. Decisions building on that literature 
were usually oriented towards the standard approach used in the respective discipline. The will-
ingness to engage this body of literature outside of physics is another moment of bifurcation. 
Here, as indicated in the introductory story, the physicists were confronted with other ways of 
doing science, of knowing as well as of dealing with uncertainties and ambivalence (see also 
part 6.2.). This knowledge had to be mobilized, e.g. through simplification, in order to work in 
their own disciplinary context:  
What I am doing is also a master’s thesis in physics, and I want to see how I can embed my 
problem in the context of network models in physics. Also, when physicists build network mod-
els they are usually less complex, because you want to be able to still understand them. And 
when social scientists build models my impression is that they want to have them as realistic as 
possible. But then it becomes harder to understand it. And I think the model I am working with 
is still quite complicated for a model in physics, a lot of processes are relevant. And yes, it would 
be cool if it would be possible to further simplify it. (16/01/2018a: 124-132) 
With this, I come to the “basic processes”. For the modelers the basic processes of a target 
system have to be describable numerically, quantifiable and measurable. And, as I already men-
tioned, the modeler laying out the linear sequence of model development insisted that the model 
should still be as simple as possible. In a first, central simplification, the question becomes: 
What are characteristic key figures of a phenomenon? 
You want to approach the issue step by step until you reach a point where a minimum of as-
sumptions results in an optimum of convergence. And then you generated an understanding of 
processes […]. And the first thing you have to do is to figure out how the system you want to 
understand can be described. And we as mathematicians and physicists try to describe it numer-
ically. And to quantify. To figure out the key figures characterizing the object of our interest. 
(31/01/2018: 76-86) 
Later in the interview he described this very aptly and pragmatically as cost-benefit-evaluation, 
but without becoming more concrete concerning simplifications: 
And of course that is always an estimation. You can also do it the other way around. You write 
down an equation and realize, oh God that is really complicated. And you take a closer look and 
see ‘if this term wouldn’t be in there anymore I could solve it’ […] and of course, there is a lot 
of theory of how you simplify such things while at the same time controlling the error, we call 
it deviation, from the exact. And that is of course a cost-benefit-evaluation. […] a large portion 
                                                 
30 Very rarely a model builds on statistical data or psychological experiments, for example.  
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of research questions I want to answer I can answer well with an approximation. (31/01/2018: 
147-155)  
Another modeler added that they are not interested in special cases. This and the need for sim-
plification was illustrated by the rich imagery used in the interviews to describe the relationship 
between model and world: they are skeletons, tools, or metaphors, symbols, binoculars and 
parallel worlds. Still, models vary in degree of abstractness. And sometimes it may take active 
work to keep model and world apart: 
Finally, what you usually do, is to take the model and say: this is how things are. You have to 
be very careful not to do it […]. You always have to remind yourself: ‘it is not real’, and you 
simply count the mistakes it contains. Or the areas where it does things differently than nature 
or contains simplifications. (16/01/2018b, 210-216).  
Simplification is a crucial aspect of modeling for at least three reasons: as a matter of aesthet-
ics,31 to keep models understandable, and easily computable as well as mutable in order to align 
model formats. For philosophers Mary Morgan and Margaret Morrison, their capacity to sim-
plify is what grants models partial independence from theory and world and therefore enables 
them to mediate between them:  
As a matter of practice, modeling always involves certain simplifications and approximations 
which have to be decided independently of the theoretical requirements or data conditions. […]. 
The crucial feature of partial independence is that models are not situated in the middle of a 
hierarchical structure between theory and world. (Morrison/ Morgan 1999: 16f emphasis in the 
original) 
The relationship between models, theories, reality and experiment has been debated at length 
in the philosophy of science (summarizing see Frigg/ Hartmann 2012).32 Conceptualizing 
“models as mediators” was a central intervention into these discussions (Morgan/ Morrison 
1999). This acknowledges models as “autonomous agents” and “instruments of investigation” 
(Morrison/ Morgan 1999: 10). 
This independence arises in the way they are constructed, function, represent and make learning 
possible. Models derive neither entirely from theory nor data, but from both and more – this 
mixture of elements grants them independence (cf. ibid: 14). Once they work, models can be 
used for multiple purposes such as theory construction and application or experiments (cf. ibid: 
                                                 
31 Discussing a model with his supervisor, one modeler exclaimed “but it is not beautiful to introduce another 
parameter into the model” (fieldnotes, 29/01/2018). Recognizing something as beautiful or “interesting” (see part 
5.3.1.) is a skilled practice situated within a discipline. 
32 Deliberations on modeling in general in the philosophy of science are connected to older questions on the epis-
temology of experiments and the role of fictions in science (vgl. Contessa 2009, Suárez 2010, Toon 2010, Wins-
berg 2010). Some focused on practices early, Morgan and Morrison mention Hesse (1966) and Gibbard/ Varian 
(1978): “Their treatments, emphasizing the physical characteristics of models [...] attempt to address questions 
concerning the interplay among theories, models, mathematical structures and aspects of creative imagination that 
has come to constitute the practice we call modeling” (Morgan/ Morrison 1999a: 7). In part 5.2.1. I will discuss 
the epistemological novelty of computer simulations of models, in part 5.2.2. models, experiments and materiality.  
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18ff). And because they involve representations of theory and of data, they are investigative 
instruments within a specific purpose or context of investigation:  
[W]e often use many different kinds of models to represent a single system. [...]. We do not 
assess each model based on its ability to accurately mirror the system, rather the legitimacy of 
each different representation is a function of the model's performance in specific contexts. (ibid: 
28)33  
Lastly, learning happens through building and manipulating the model (cf. ibid: 30- 33).  
Seeing simplifications and simple conceptual models as an epistemic advantage, not just a prac-
tical necessity was a guiding principle of modeling in this group. At least in these first steps of 
model construction, the model itself was at the center of the inquiry.  
Looking at simplifications from anthropology and STS I heed two insights that cautioned me 
against rushing too quickly into an evaluation or even judgement of simplification as “reduc-
tionist” or “essentialist”.34 First, the centrality of simplification as a productive epistemic prac-
tice for model development needs to be acknowledged, as the anthropologist Anders Munk 
described it in his account of learning how to model flooding. In fact, the efficacy of modeling 
rests on simplification. In learning how to model he learned how to make simplifications mean-
ingful:  
Tied in and related through a set of formalisms the composites of the model are made to do 
something meaningful. [...] I know from the hydrological cycle on the flip chart and from the 
perceptual sketches of the environment in my field notes that things are missing. Everything is 
not here. But there are absences for which I have been taught to account – the co-conspiring 
parts of an arrangement to make the model speak on behalf of a world much wider than itself. 
As our instructor pointed out, there would be no point in the models if they were replicating in 
every particular the things modelled. The point in models, in other words, is their transformation 
of the things they model into simpler forms. It is this specific and purposive process of doing 
away with things which I have been able to engage in through my apprenticeship. (Munk 2013: 
158) 
Secondly, framing matters for simplifications. In their study of a participatory hydrological 
modeling project Catharina Landström et al. highlight that even though all models simplify, the 
decisions about what to leave out depend on the framing of the problem rather than any inde-
pendent, objective set of criteria. Most model development is done with framings that tend 
towards the general rather than the particular (cf. Landström et al. 2011: 1631). 
Even though that was also the case here, I was not able to delve far enough into the various 
model contents as to do justice to the simplifications within their frame. It proved very difficult 
                                                 
33 With this, they move beyond questions of representational adequacy to a more relational perspective, much like 
Marion Vorms did with her focus on model formats (see part 5.). I will come back to the question of representation 
and of models as investigative tools when I discuss models and experiments (see part 5.2.2., esp. foot note 49). 
34 But I do want to maintain that simplifications deserve more scrutiny, because they are also normative. “Models 
of” can become “models for” wittingly or unwittingly (cf. Geertz 1973: 93-94), and have an effect in the world. 
And the use of models in this research groups to generate “narratives” is right in-between that (see part 5.3.2.). 
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to get close to concrete simplifications. I already noticed this at my very first day with the 
research group, when during a discussion at a team meeting I inquired after ways of simplifying. 
While some of them tried to explain it with a concrete example I was not able to follow at that 
point, somebody else said “through abstraction and reduction”, which was still quite unspecific, 
even redundant. This remains an issue for further inquiry, but understanding simplifications 
was also not the central aim of this work, especially since from a practice theoretical perspec-
tive, simplification is more than just following explicit rules of how to simplify process X into 
value x’. Rather, I wanted to gain a basic understanding of the process of model development 
as a whole in this particular research group. This is why for now I have to write about simplifi-
cation as a practice of alignment on a more general level.  
To sum up: Simplification is central to model development, it is framed by a research purpose 
and like the literature review and the formulation of a research interest it is situated in a thought 
collective. In the following section on experimentation in constructing and manipulating the 
model, I will show how it is indeed not just an application of certain rules I could potentially 
uncover with more research. As a part of the whole process of model development, simplifica-
tion is entwined with other practices. When the model is assembled by aligning the different 
model formats, e.g. mathematical to computational model, simplifying may again be required 
– but for more pragmatic reasons.  
 
5.2. Experimentation 
After the model structure was clear the student tried to include a certain aspect of some-
body else's work into their model of opinion dynamics. A paper had already been pub-
lished on it and since the code is open source, he had access to that as well. However, 
there was one particular equation he kept stumbling over so he asked one of his super-
visors for help: “I don't really understand this equation. I mean, it is supposed to be a 
conditional probability, but then sometimes it becomes bigger than 1. That actually 
shouldn't happen with a probability, right?” The supervisor agreed: “No, it shouldn't.” 
He took a closer look: “Maybe there is a typo somewhere? Do you already have results 
from trying to integrate that into your model?”   
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The student showed him two plots with his laptop. 
Each of them displayed two graphs, one in green 
and one in pink. In the first plot, they both ran jag-
gedly downwards from the top left corner to the 
bottom right corner. The second plot looked quite 
different, with strong oscillations in the lower half 
of the quadrant. This astonished the supervisor. 
For a moment, he stared at the screen in silence, 
then shook his head: “That is strange. Crazy. I 
mean, continue your analysis and if it comes up 
more often, it might indicate a new feature.” They 
talked about something else for a while, then the 
supervisor leaned forward again, still bewildered: 
“This is really interesting”.  
The student then called up a third plot: “This is where the conditional probability actu-
ally was bigger than 1”. One graph rose continuously, while the other rose at first and 
then fell again. The supervisor looked again at the equation in the paper: “I thought I 
had understood it, but apparently it can actually be bigger than one. So, maybe if we 
look at it as if it was a ratio, not a probability... you know, simply as a comparison of 
values?” The student again called up the plot so that now both equation and plot are 
visible next to each other on the screen of his laptop. The supervisor nods: “Yes, that's 
it! That makes sense”. It appeared as if the problem had been solved, the knot disentan-
gled. Plot and equation made sense of each other. But the student was not quite satisfied: 
“Then why is it that in the code there is a (-1) behind the equation?” He opened another 
window on the screen showing the code. The supervisor leaned so far forward to take a 
closer look that his glasses threatened to slip off his nose: “Funny. I’ll have to think 
about this a bit more in depth. We will get back to that later. For now, keep implementing 
the model and I will try to understand it. Maybe I can get a hold of the person who wrote 
the code, I think I've met them at a conference last year. Also, sometimes that program-
ming language requires you to add or subtract a one so that it is all correct in the end. 
But all in all you are doing very good work and qualitatively the model output seems to 
be more or less correct.” He explained the next practical steps: “Soon you should begin 
to do ensemble runs. Some of the oscillations and jumps in the plots will even themselves 
out then. And even if they don't, your work could contribute to an understanding as to 




why that is. Sometimes, oscillations, like slow fluctuations, are normal in a state of equi-
librium.” And he moved his hand in a wavelike motion. Then they kept discussing cer-
tain parameters, expected results and external forcings in the model. The supervisor 
drew possible shapes of graphs in the air. Another form of embodied modeling, I 
thought, just analogue and based on experience.  
The problem seemed to have been solved, the alignment was successful. But, three weeks 
later, when the student and the supervisor met again, the student brought up the equa-
tion again. He wrote it on the whiteboard pointing to the last factor in the equation: “I 
have tried to work with the equation, but I really don't understand where this factor 
comes from and what it is supposed to do.” The supervisor took the pen, erased the 
factor and notated it in more detail as a fraction. Then he wrote Bayes' Theorem under-
neath it, the basic form of a conditional probability, and tried to translate one into the 
other, drawing arrows between parts of the two equations. But it did not quite add up, 
even though a resemblance seemed to be there. After more than an hour of discussion, 
they reached a provisional, but not satisfying understanding. Then the supervisor reread 
the part in the paper where the equation was explained: “This is not really helpful. This 
whole thing is really counterintuitive. I need some more time to dig deeper into this. It 
is not necessarily wrong, but it is certainly not explained well. Maybe I should ask some 
colleagues about it as well.” He then summed up the problem again for the student to 
write it down and asked: “Would you actually be able to implement this, just for fun, to 
see what happens?” The student hesitated, then shook his head: “No, I think that would 
be too much effort. I'll wait and see what else we'll find out about it”. 
 
5.2.1. “And then you think about, ok, how can I approach this systematically? […] And little 
by little you assemble the model.” 
Assembling the model is not a straightforward or deterministic process. In this section, I will 
focus on the alignment of mathematical and computational model formats, especially the work 
of coding, which is of course not completely detached from mental models and visualizations, 
as the scene above already illustrated.  
Aligning equations and code usually happened when processes have been identified and sim-
plified so that the basic model structure is clear, but programming could also serve experimental 
purposes following a vague idea or a hunch that something might be interesting (an example 
can be found in part 5.3.2). Alignment at this stage of model development may still influence 
the assumptions and simplifications of the central processes, both because it tests and disproves 
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some of the assumptions (see part 5.2.2) or because, more pragmatically, not every idea is easily 
translatable into equations or code (see below). 
Experimentation as a practice of alignment is more strongly linked to iteration than the other 
practices. And through parameter runs understood as experiments with the model (see part 
5.2.2.) it also connects modeling with experimental practices in the laboratory. This first part 
therefore is about model construction and iteration, the following part describes model manip-
ulation more explicitly as an experimentation process. I still chose to frame this as experimen-
tation rather than “iteration” or something comparable, because no clear rules exist for con-
structing a computational model, neither for an iterative nor a linear sequence of steps. 
A few words on iteration: when I asked in the interviews what modeling is like in the everyday, 
one answer was: “usually it is very profane, I sit in front of my computer and produce some 
random code or shove equations around.” The modeler who said this then continued to explain 
with more excitement, what modeling is for him on a more abstract, ideal level. I wondered 
why it then ends up being so profane and he described the concretization of a modeling idea as 
“fiddling around [rumgefrickel]” (23/01/2018: 22-35). During the interviews I’ve conducted, 
the modeling process was described as iteration frequently and explicitly, though often nuanced 
differently: either as a tedious fiddling around or more positively as playing around. The latter 
denotes creativity and freedom, where surprises happen and “interesting” things become visible 
(see section 5.3.). Iteration also has a collective aspect, because the research group and the wider 
academic community was used as a corrective when work is repeatedly presented and exposed 
to criticism. 
The scene at the beginning of this section illustrates how the model formats work together in 
order to make aspects of a model understandable and transparent for others. It focuses on a 
mathematical model, and on the needed collaboration of equation and text, but also shows how 
code and a plot of model output come into play: The plot suggested that something was not as 
it should be. In that sense, it illustrated a situation of misalignment, disturbing the smooth pro-
cess of model construction. 
To give some epistemological and theoretical context, in the first part I discuss the question 
what is new about computer simulations in modeling in order to clarify the specificity of this 
model format. In the second part I will go into the issue of comparing computer experiments 
and laboratory experiments and the question whether epistemic privilege of the latter is bound 
to material continuity between experimental system and target system. 
Before I elaborate on the epistemology of computer simulations and writing of a model code, I 
want to emphasize that advances in mathematics crucially impacted modeling, just as did the 
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more obvious technological changes like the computer, even though it may seem to be a less 
“flashy” format.35 I will not go into details of depicting the mathematical model now, a format 
that remained largely opaque for me during my field work, but I will get back to its entangle-
ment with the code at the end of this section because the interface between mathematical equa-
tion and computer code is maybe the most crucial interface for creating bifurcations with higher 
degrees of irreversibility. 
In the introduction to their edited volume on computer simulations, Küppers, Lenhard and 
Shinn emphasized four novelties of computer simulations: (1) Simulation has become almost 
omnipresent in many areas of life, (2) the speed and capacity of calculation in computer tech-
nology made new kinds of questions and models possible, (3) they also allow for the generation 
of visualizations and, finally, (4) “[Programming languages] determine to an important extent 
how programs can be conducted and how the […] social practice of programming operates.” 
(Küppers et al. 2006: 8).36 I will treat programming languages and related aspects in part 5.2.2., 
and visualizations in section 5.3. Now I want to demonstrate and discuss what the new capacity 
of calculation made possible.  
Whereas the modelers in the research group talked about models creating “parallel worlds“ with 
their models, Gabriele Gramelsberger calls them “extreme worlds” and distinguishes between 
the extreme worlds that mathematical and computational models create. Due to their more com-
plex structure, computational models are able to render the worlds created in the mathematical 
model less extreme:  
Computer-based models and their simulations allow for a consideration of more variables and 
relevant parameters, not having to eliminate or linearize dependences, the choice of more com-
plex geometric forms and not having to study extreme conditions. In short: the computer enables 
an indefinite increase in degrees of freedom of a system. (Gramelsberger 2010: 245, translation 
AK) 
Computational models constitute calculation rules for the mathematical models in order to ex-
amine them quantitatively: 
A scientific programmer does not have to create patterns of relationships between variables and 
examine these quantitatively. Rather, he has to fit these patterns into the conditions of solvability 
                                                 
35 see Gramelsberger 2010: 17-37 for a summary of mathematical developments 
36 Historically, Evelyn Fox-Keller describes how the epistemological novelty of computer simulations emerged 
gradually: “Provisionally, I suggest three such stages: (a) the use of the computer to extract solutions from pre-
specified but mathematically intractable sets of equations by means of either conventional or novel methods of 
numerical analysis; (b) the use of the computer to follow the dynamics of systems of idealized particles (‘computer 
experiments’) in order to identify the salient features required for physically realistic approximations (or models); 
(c) the construction of models (theoretical and/or ‘practical’) of phenomena for which no general theory exists and 




and thus generate practical calculation rules minimizing structural loss vis-à -vis the mathemat-
ical model […]. In addition to mathematical conditions, computational conditions have to be 
considered. (ibid: 241f , Translation AK) 
The computer constituted a new “condition of solvability” (ibid), because it enabled the mod-
elers to simulate differential equations – but only through simplification and discretization:  
To mesh them with a digital computer, the continuous equations have to be transformed into 
discrete objects. Continuous differential equations are replaced by difference equations. 
Whereas the differential equations represent the functional (global) relationship between the 
variables, the difference equations determine the local values of the variables in different time 
steps. (Küppers et al. 2006: 10) 
Simulations are not solutions in the strictest sense, even though they made it possible to work 
with differential equations, “rather, simulations are numerical imitations of the unknown solu-
tion of differential equations, or more precisely, the imitation of complex dynamics by a suita-
ble generative mechanism” (ibid: 9). Various manners of discretization are possible, often al-
ready available as existing subroutines or “packages”. This is a critical moment in modeling, 
because it is not possible to prove the equivalence of a differential equation and its discretization 
into a difference equation (cf. Gramelsberger 2010: 242).  
The choice of parameterizations (see part 5.2.2.), of initial conditions (the scenario the model 
simulates) and of boundary conditions may further estrange the computational from the math-
ematical model (cf. ibid: 246). This lack of equivalence leads philosopher of science Wendy 
Parker to describe the mathematical model as a target system of the computational model:  
The upshot is that, like the material/physical systems that scientists set out to simulate in the 
first place, the mathematical systems specified by the preferred model equations and by the 
programmed equations must be thought of as target systems, and conclusions about them on the 
basis of computer simulation results cannot be automatic, but rather require justification. Of 
course, scientists who actually perform simulation studies often recognize this. (Parker 2009: 
490) 
The point so far is that in practice, programming is not just a question of translating equations 
into code as exactly as possible. Rather, it is a bit of an epistemological scramble or patchwork, 
and introducing the computer into the mêlée brought with it a host of new, unforeseeable issues 
and practices. Paul Humphreys, a pioneer in the philosophical study of simulations, even claims 
that “[c]omputational science introduces new issues into the philosophy of science because it 
uses methods that push humans away from the center of the epistemological enterprise” (Hum-
phreys 2009: 617), requiring a non-anthropocentric account of epistemology (cf. ibid: 625).37 
                                                 
37 Karen Barad made a similar claim for knowledge-practices in general and with this questions the separation 
between ontology and epistemology: “There is an important sense in which practices of knowing cannot be fully 
claimed as human practices […] because knowing is a matter of part of the world making itself intelligible to 
another part. Practices of knowing and being are not isolatable, but rather they are mutually implicated […]. The 
separation of epistemology from ontology is a reverberation of a metaphysics that assumes an inherent difference 
between human and nonhuman, subject and object, mind and body, matter and discourse. Onto-epistem-ology – 
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This is provocative, but it echoes the attentiveness paid to the specificities of models when 
Morgan and Morrison (1999) described them as mediators.  
Concerning computational models, they claim that certain structural features of models enable 
and constrain simulations.38 In her study of computer experiments in the context of climate 
modeling, Gabriele Gramelsberger extends their argument on models as mediators in under-
standing simulations as “autonomous agents”. She turns their question on its head, asking 
whether now simulations determine the structure of models and theories as simulatable, leading 
to a new class of models, theories and experiments (cf. Gramelsberger 2010: 231). She then 
problematizes how in the recent literature there is no close description of practices of scientific 
programming:  
This can only mean that it is generally assumed that mathematical models can be translated into 
a program without greater problems. Or that the computer is only understood as a theoretical 
variable in the sense of solvability which justifies talking about certain properties in very general 
terms. Both marginalizations are incorrect. (ibid: 235) 
Even though I will not be able to fill that research gap, I will now describe the programming of 
the computational model, because coding is a thought-provoking activity, where decisions 
about the model structure are being made and a processual understanding of the model is gen-
erated. Then I will describe some instances where the iterative alignment of mathematical 
model and computational model proved difficult and thus led to further simplifications within 
the model. 
In a first step I want to define “code” for the purpose of this anthropological study. Here, I build 
on the work of sociologist and software developer Adrian Mackenzie. His main point is that 
even though code seems to be an abstract, remarkably context-free grammar, a formalism, or 
clear rules of operations on items of data, programming is a technical as well as a cultural 
practice: 
Despite appearing 'merely' technical, technical knowledge-practices overlap and enmesh with 
imaginings of sociality, individual identity, community, collectivity, organization and enter-
prise. Technical practices of programming interlace with cultural practices. […]. However, no 
computer code, not even textbook demonstrations of principle, can maintain this level of ab-
straction. [...], code itself inevitably slips into tangles of competing idioms, practices, techniques 
and patterns of circulation. [...] Code can be read as permeated by all the forms of contestation, 
feeling, identification, intensity, contextualizations and decontextualizations, signification, 
                                                 
the study of practices of knowing in being – is probably a better way to think about the kind of understandings that 
are needed to come to terms with how specific intra-actions matter” (Barad 2003: 829). I am not able to go fully 
into the implications of this here, but I will take issues of ontology and epistemology up again in part 6. 
38 “Although simulation and modeling are closely associated it is important to isolate what it is about a model that 
enables it to ‘represent’ by producing simulations. This function is, at least in the first instance, due to certain 
structural features of the model, features that explain and constrain behavior produced in simulations. In the same 
way that general theoretical principles can constrain the ways in which models are constructed, so too the structure 
of the model constrains the kinds of behavior that can be simulated.” (Morrison/ Morgan 1999: 29) 
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power relations, imaginings and embodiments that comprise any cultural object. (Mackenzie 
2006: 4-5)  
Therefore, he continues, “[c]ode is agency-saturated” (ibid: 9). But this agency is distributed 
unevenly and in some situations, e.g. a virus attack, the critical agents become hard to identify 
(cf. ibid: 10). This is one way, in which humans are pushed away “from the center of the epis-
temological enterprise” of modeling (cf. Humphreys 2009: 617). An important factor determin-
ing how agency in coding is distributed is skill growing with experience. In an interview, some-
body pondered the possibility that while constructing a model may not become routine, imple-
menting it in code will – with increasing experience. The less experience one has, the less one 
knows how to interpret or avoid altogether errors and bugs in coding, for example.  
Two spontaneous remarks illustrate how in the research group, coding was assumed to either 
form ideas – “We think in code, actually” – or to merely express them – “coding is only the 
technical part, not the real science. Or, well, maybe you can't separate it that easily”. Both 
claims were applicable to varying degrees depending on the situation. Coding is a crucial 
knowledge practice for learning about and with a model. One way this happened was through 
translation from one programming language into another. It is not always necessary, but a mod-
eler who did it admitted: “of course it is a lot of work to do it myself. But first of all, it’s fun 
and secondly, through writing it myself I have developed a better under-standing of the model” 
(16/01/2018a: 196-198). That did not mean that the basic structure of the model had to be 
changed in any way, but simply the fact that Python offers packages for processes that he had 
to write himself in more detail in C++ made a difference for his understanding. 
On a more general note, choosing a programming language presents an important bifurcation 
in model construction.39 Somebody else described how the model he used was written in an 
older language, FORTRAN, and because it was a bigger, more complicated Earth System 
Model, it would be too much work to translate it into a newer language. In a slightly different 
case, the research group decided to translate the framework they developed from Python into 
C++, which took a lot of effort. For some parts and functions of the model this was easier than 
for others, which shows again that degrees of irreversibility are closely linked to a programming 
language and the kind of expressions it enables or at least makes easier. 
                                                 
39 Programming languages play an important part in the emergence of new practices and competencies in relation 
to computer simulation. This forms new collectivities: “This takes the form of shared techniques (the neural net-
work model, cellular automata, Monte Carlo models, etc.), shared simulation-linked informatics languages (such 
as Simula or the general purpose, multiparadigm, object-oriented C++ simulation language, […]), shared compe-
tencies, shared images, and shared horizons. Taken together, such common resources, reactions, and perceptions 
constitute a lingua franca, itself akin in some ways to a form of practical universality” (Küppers et al 2006: 20). 
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A second way of learning by coding was the classic “learning through mistakes”, since code is 
unforgiving and demands clarity in expression: “When I translate the whole thing for the com-
puter […] if I don’t tell it clearly what I want, it won’t do anything.  […]. Writing the code, it 
has to be unambiguous […], otherwise it will produce a mistake” (18/01/2018a: 101-111). 
One could almost say code is resisting too easy an implementation of an idea, forcing a pro-
grammer to think it through thoroughly: “So, then you have thought about a more appropriate 
way for a model component. And then you turn it on and then there is the problem and you 
spend the rest of the day fixing it” (18/01/2018b: 197-199) 
Bug-fixing while trying out new ideas simply made up a big part of the workday.40 Looking for 
mistakes became even more difficult (or instructive) when somebody else wrote the code: “in 
that case, you have to read a lot of the code and try to understand what is actually happening. 
And you have to jump around a lot between the different files, to look where else the problem 
is happening. And that always took a lot of time” (18/01/2018b: 204-208). This suggests a 
certain intimacy between a programmer and their code. However, once the problem was dealt 
with, the code became controllable and mutable again41: “When I want to try something out, I 
expand the code and in principle I add a switch where I can turn that new part on and off” 
(06/02/2018: 233-234). 
Taking a closer look at code it was easy to see that it is never just pure code. Instead, all kinds 
of comments were strewn in.  The hashtag # (Python) or a double slash // (C++) was used to 
insert headings, ToDos, instructions and explanations into the code. Some of these would be 
removed before publication, others expanded. This also structured the code visually:  
                                                 
40 This can be seen as a form of verification of the correctness of the code “on the go”, instead of as a separate step 
in model development. Eric Winsberg states that at least in the philosophy of science, verification of the model 
code has been more or less ignored, as opposed to the validation of the whole model. Comparable to my account 
of iteration in modeling practices he questions the strict separation of these two ways to examine a model: “The 
equations we choose often reflect a compromise between what we think best describes the phenomena and com-
putational tractability. So the equations that are chosen are rarely well ‘validated’ on their own. […]. So one point 
is that verification and validation are not independently-successful and separable activities. But the other point is 
that there are not two independent entities onto which these activities can be directed: a model chosen to be dis-
cretized, and a method for discretizing it. [...]. So success is achieved in simulation with a kind of back-and-forth, 
trial-and-error, piecemeal adjustment between model and method of calculation” (Winsberg 2015: 18f). 
41 With mutability I refer again to Adrian Mackenzie: “Software embodies a mixture of mutability, contingency, 
necessity” He continues about coding: “[...] Borrowing a concept of physics, we could say that software undergoes 
phase transitions or changes of state. It solidifies at some points, but vaporizes at others" (Mackenzie 2006: 1f).  
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Some comments characterized the code as work in progress and were used to delay decisions, 
for example. In the code of the model framework, hidden at the end of a line, a # indicated the 
need for a decision between two ways of calculating countries’ gross domestic product:  
economic_output_flow = \         
Variable("total economic output flow",  
"(in value units)",  
 IAMC="GDP|PPP",  # or GDP|MER?    
 unit = dollars / years, 
lower_bound=0, is_extensive=True, default=0) 42 
These comments are part of the work it takes to separate code and modeler, as the fact that other 
people's mistakes are much more difficult to fix already suggested. Comments make the code 
legible, transparent and transferable for others. They redistribute agency and put the modeler 
closer to the epistemological center of modeling. Some programming languages require this 
documentation more than others. The modeler who had begun to translate the modeling frame-
work from Python into C++ explained some features of C++ to his colleagues: “This is nasty, 
if you don’t know that, the whole thing is quite cryptic. In C++ you have to be a stickler for 
                                                 
42 This may not be a trivial decision because the IPCC discussed it in its fourth assessment report. I do not know 
if that caused this comment, but once the decision is made and not made transparent, the outcome could a) be 
misinterpreted by people who are aware of that discussion and b) have an impact on model output: “To summarize: 
available evidence indicates that the differences between projected emissions using MER exchange rates and PPP 
exchange rates are small in comparison to the uncertainties represented by the range of scenarios and the likely 
impacts of other parameters and assumptions made in developing scenarios, for example, technological change. 
However, the debate clearly shows the need for modelers to be more transparent in explaining conversion factors, 
as well as taking care in determining exogenous factors used for their economic and emission scenarios” (Metz et 
al. 2007).  
Figure 5: Screenshot of model code (23/01/2018). Comments are grey. Reproduced with permission. 
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documentation, if others are supposed to be able to work with your code. It is almost impossible 
to debug a macro you haven’t developed yourself” (fieldnotes, 10/01/2018). 
Another connotation of code, to encode or encrypt, maybe comes closer to what is happening 
here. Without the comments, the explanations, the alignment of language and programming 
language, even the code authors would lose their overview. This became more and more of a 
problem for the growing research group, where modelers changed but models stayed, and where 
the models were an important part of the output. They were usually published in papers and 
additionally made accessible as open source code. This issue came up during one of the team 
meetings, when they spent more time than usual discussing teamwork and atmosphere. They 
decided to document more of the process of model construction, and to explain the reasons for 
decisions they made, especially when an option was not chosen: “Some of this can be written 
directly into the code”, somebody remarked (fieldnotes, 22/01/2018).43 
The need for comments illustrates the difference between language and code (even though it is 
written in a programming language), and between the formats of mental model and computa-
tional model. This lack of equivalence is also indicated by the fact that the research group 
wanted to publish example code in the paper introducing a new model, because that would 
better illustrate its use than only an explanatory text. The practical intimacy between a modeler 
and their code further suggests that implementation is not as linear as the apparent formalism 
of programming languages would lead one to believe. It is more idiosyncratic. Anders Munk 
emphasizes this connectedness with the hybrid figure of the model-modeler:  
If it is true to say that we would be useless as modelers without the aid of the computer pro-
gramme, it is equally true to say that the programme would be useless without the aid of us, its 
modelers, for translating the world into formats which conform to its inbuilt hydrodynamic for-
malizations of nature. Computer Simulation thus implies the becoming of a hybrid – the model-
modeler. (Munk 2013: 145) 
In this non-anthropocentric account of epistemology, the model-modeler hybrid bridges the 
misalignment between model formats and allows them to unfold their respective characteristics 
in the various material-semiotic practices. It therefore plays a crucial part in aligning the model, 
of making it sensible and getting it to work.  
With this I want to return from this detailed zoom into the code to the alignment of mathematical 
and computational model, which is the main issue of this part. As stated above, it is crucial for 
                                                 
43 It is interesting when in a group the need for more formality and documentation arises. The group has grown, 
and members changed all the time. And because there now is a project, the modeling framework that transcends 
the individual members, the transmission of information had to be secured and made transparent. It was a moment 
of transformation for the research group, more or less forced also through model- and financing structures. But 
formalization is a double edged sword as one of the senior members hinted at: “we need more order as an aim, but 
a certain disorder is also good” (fieldnotes, 22/01/2018). 
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creating more or less irreversible bifurcations in model construction. The computational model 
and the mathematical model go hand-in-hand and iteratively shape each other. In the most pro-
ductive sense, mathematical model and computational model build on and complement each 
other, such as in this agent-based model: 
At first, you write down the equations, describing for example an agent’s dynamic. But then 
you have to think about how you can numerically simulate this for every agent. That means, 
that I have to write code, where I don’t have to write spell this equation out for each of my many 
agents. I have to fiddle around, until for each agent I have some sort of representation, or de-
scriptive variable and can apply this equation to all of them. Then I have to write a lot of code 
around it, so that I don’t have to implement this for every single agent. Instead, I write some 
sort of loop that iterates over all the agents. (23/01/2018, 314-323) 
But iterating between mathematical and computational model is not always as seamless as the 
quote above suggests. Even though computational models made approximate solutions of dif-
ferential equations possible (see above), not all mathematical problems are solvable, even 
though in this particular case it is not clear whether it was a problem with the used code-pack-
age, the mathematics or a lack of experience: 
I wanted to implement this beautiful study and I did, but then the set of equations wasn’t solva-
ble. And I spent a lot of time trying different solvers and it simply didn’t work. So I had to 
change the model again […] which was a pity, because it was the only really new idea I put in 
my model and now it is lost. (18/01/2018b, 232-239) 
He then decided to use an average value, as his supervisor had suggested: “this was a simple 
possibility [...] I mean, once you get it to run properly like that, then later you can always try 
again to solve the original problem” (18/01/2018b, 282-286). 
This pragmatism was echoed by his colleague: “I think a lot is trial-and-error, external condi-
tions, feasibility, time management. So, when you code you think ‘ok, this solution is prettier, 
but takes more time’. So I’ll do it differently, maybe not as pretty, but requiring only a fraction 
of the time” (16/01/2018a, 304-308). 
And of course, not just mathematics and code could limit each other. The modeler’s experience 
and knowledge also plays a part and is shaped by the learning process that is the construction 
of a model regardless of the modeler’s academic status: 
I also have agents who are more or less complicated in the way they make decisions. For the 
computational models, it worked relatively well with algorithmic heuristics. But for some kind 
of aggregated decision I had to throw it away again because it couldn’t be expressed in aggre-
gated equations, at least with the knowledge I had at that point. […]. That would be a possible 
future project, to see if I could at least get a partly aggregated understanding to work mathemat-
ically. (01/02/2018, 189-195) 
Whereas computational and mental model format were aligned in this case, an alignment of the 
mathematical model proved more difficult which led to a delay in including agents with that 
particular ability of making decisions.  
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The next step after experimentation in model construction is experimentation in model manip-
ulation through “letting the model run repeatedly”. One of the modelers emphasized: “You 
shouldn’t get lost in coding because ultimately it is only a set-up, like an experimental system 
or something. Or a form of study design in the social sciences” (16/01/2018a, 276-279). In the 
following part I will interrogate that comparison of experimenting in modeling and laboratory 
experiments, asking: “Does matter really matter?” (Parker 2009). 
 
5.2.2. “And you let it run again and again” 
In the framing of this work, experimentation is a practice of alignment. I already mentioned that 
experimentation is more iterative in character, especially in the previous part, where I described 
how “little by little you assemble the model”.  I have clarified how computational models are 
not exact solutions of mathematical models that consist of differential equations. Thus, they 
require new ways of investigation in order to understand their properties and behavior – like 
parameter runs, as one of the modelers explained in reference to a classical physical model: 44  
And actually, the models we build, with complex systems and networks, are also models, only 
that often you can’t describe them analytically anymore, in equations giving you a result. Instead 
you have to examine the parameters… or let simulations run and then you understand the system 
through those parameter runs. Generally, physicists, they simply want to understand models and 
stuff. (06/02/2018, 14-19) 
In this part, I want to focus on experimentation more literally. I will now explain what param-
eters are, how parameter runs are used to explore properties and behavior of a model, being 
understood as experiments with the model. Then I come to the question of the relation between 
materiality, “experiments, simulations and epistemic privilege” (Parke 2014) in order to inter-
rogate whether and how experiments in modeling can be seen in continuation with laboratory 
experiments. As one possible answer I will introduce how philosopher and STS scholar Tarja 
Knuuttila (2005, 2006, and 2011) conceives of models as epistemic artefacts or tools. 
Parameters are certain deterministic or stochastic values that characterize entities in an agent-
environment model examining reinforcement learning, for example: 
If all agents are homogenous, that means all the parameters are the same, they don’t change. 
Because they all learn to react in the same way to the other’s behavior. They learn the same. 
Their behavior is the same. […]. When I have heterogeneous agents, then I have more parame-
ters to examine. And the different environments have parameters, too. And then I can choose 
some and then try to understand, how the different agents behave in the respective parameter 
space. (18/01/2018a, 214-223) 
                                                 
44 That is one reason why computer simulations could even be seen as a new type of experimentation, or “extension 
of empirical research” (Gramelsberger 2010: 268 in ref. to Humphreys 2004), such as immediate observation and 
its technological mediation with microscopes or telescopes, for example. It enables experiments with mathematics 
in time and space in order to make visible and understand trajectories and processes (cf. ibid: 251). 
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Even the simplest models contain parameters. In general, they are used to include smaller-scale 
processes into a model by subsuming them under this one value. This kind of operationalization 
is called sub-grid parameterization and is another practice of simplification.45 They can make 
all the difference between models and can be used for biophysical as well as social processes, 
from the Albedo effect to forgetfulness and well-being. 
In the models used by the research group, parameters could be derived from statistical data, 
empirical studies or simply assumed to be more or less accurate to explore model dynamics. As 
“switches” they could be used to turn different model components on, such as different types 
of agents, which could be included one after the other into a model. As characterizations of 
(often human) agents in network models and representations also of social processes, they were 
closely linked to assumptions about “the social”, e.g. whether and how agents make rational 
decision or how quickly agents adopt somebody else’s opinion (see part 6.1.). Nevertheless, 
using too many parameters was not considered “elegant” and made a model uninteresting. 
Experimenting through model runs is a crucial aspect of computational modeling in general (cf. 
Hastrup 2013: 5). Parameter runs are used to explore the influence of certain parameter settings 
on the model behavior, e.g. in performing a bifurcation analysis. They produce plots that make 
visible these effects and are hence a model format involved in practices of experimentation and 
visualization (see part 5.3.1.). Most of the models in this research group were so simple, that a 
run on a normal computer only took a few minutes up to half an hour. But a model with several 
parameters needs to run with different combinations of those parameters and of different values 
of these parameters. That means it may have to run several hundred times which would take 
too long on a normal computer:  
Well, modeling itself took only the last two months of my thesis research. Letting the model run 
again and again, look at the results, see what’s happening, change the model again, set up runs 
on the Cluster again, let it run another 100 times. Or you directly set up 10 different parameter 
combinations and let that run, check the results, and then usually change the model again be-
cause something doesn’t seem to be right. (18/01/2018b, 216-222) 
That is why at a certain point in the process of model construction the modelers began to use 
the so-called “cluster”, the central super computer, for a bigger amount of systematic parameter 
runs. The model formats were now sufficiently aligned that the model could be used for sys-
tematic experimentation, because “once you have the model, the possibilities of what you can 
                                                 
45 See Sundberg 2016 on parameterizations in climate models as boundary objects between modelers and scientists 
generating observational data. See also Guillemot 2010a on practices of relating observations and simulations in 
the validation of climate models. 
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try out are endless” (06/02/2018, 121-124). It was now worth to go through the effort of pre-
paring and planning runs on the cluster.46 This indicates a moment where the past bifurcations 
in model development have reached a higher degree of irreversibility. That does not mean that 
components might not be changed again at all, but that the basic structure reached a certain 
stability and now it was a matter of using aforementioned “switches” to turn model components 
off and on and taking care of details. 
The possibility to experiment was considered an advantage of the computational model over 
the mathematical model or other, more static model formats: “I really like computational mod-
els as models because they make it very easy to check your assumptions and to experiment” 
(01/02/2018, 261-263). In her introduction to “The social life of climate change models” an-
thropologist Kirsten Hastrup gives a broad definition of experimentation: 
Experimentation implies some kind of manipulation with forms, computationally, mentally, or 
experientially. Once a form has been established that depicts the regularities, experimentation 
allows for trying out the not-yet-realized, the possible; […]. One could say that experimentation 
allows the object to ‘talk back’, or the matter to really matter – at least within the model. 
(Hastrup 2013: 5, emphasis in the original). 
But what does it mean, that “the matter really matters”? Comparing computer experiments and 
laboratory experiments as material semiotic practices raises the question of where the material 
is situated in the computer experiment. I want to briefly lay out two opposing ways of answering 
this question in order to situate a third position from a different angle. 
On the one side, matter matters. Philosopher Mary Morgan claims that laboratory experiments 
enjoy epistemic privilege over computer simulations because of a material continuity given 
between world and laboratory experiment but not between world and simulation: “ontological 
equivalence provides epistemological power” (Morgan 2005: 326). A second reason is that the 
ability to “not only surprise but also confound” (Morgan 2005: 324) only pertains to laboratory 
experiments. Gramelsberger sharpens these claims as “the corrective of material resistance” 
that computer experiments cannot hope for (Gramelsberger 2010: 194).  
On the other side, Emily Parke refutes both claims made by Mary Morgan. Assuming that a 
material correspondence between object and target of inquiry automatically bestows an exper-
iment with greater epistemic value and inferential power is unfounded: 
I agree with Parker (2009) that material object-target correspondence does not necessarily mean 
greater epistemic value. The above considerations establish a further point: It does not even 
follow from the fact that we have a material system as our object of study (that is, we are doing 
an experiment) that material correspondence is doing, or is even meant to be doing, the work in 
validating an inference. (Parke 2014: 9)  
                                                 
46 Some of the modelers worked on a method to automatize these runs. 
40 
 
For judging these, a distinction between experiment and simulation grounded in the lack of 
material continuity between model and target system is not as decisive as the context either of 
them is used in: “For addressing certain kinds of questions, realism and material correspond-
ence seem paramount. For other kinds of questions, they do not” (ibid: 17).  
Also the ability to surprise, which Parke interprets as referring to the observation of unexpected 
behaviors and hidden mechanisms or causal factors, is not pertinent to experiments alone (cf. 
ibid: 13, 16). She uses ABMs as a case in point for the display of unexpected behavior and cites 
early studies by Joshua Epstein that showed emergence of complex patterns from simple rules 
to illustrate surprise by hidden mechanisms. 
From my own disciplinary perspective, I agree with Parke’s call for context-sensitivity in ana-
lyzing methods and the concrete ways inferences are made. Additionally, it is not only a matter 
of questions that experiments or simulations address because that limits inquiries into modeling 
again to the adequacy between model and target system. Epistemic value or claims of inference 
also rest on concrete practices and transformations (like simplification in this case) that make 
something “experimentable” or “simulatable”, like simplification or visualization, for example. 
These need to be taken into account as well.  
I now come to a third way of dealing with materiality in computer simulation modeling that 
approaches the issue from a different angle. Like Morgan, Knuuttila underlines that “models 
are typically made out of different stuff and embodied in a different scale than the things mod-
eled” (Knuuttila 2006: 41). Unlike Morgan, she does not take this as a point of departure to 
judge their epistemic value as inferior to experiments. Rather, she approaches the models them-
selves as material artefacts or precisely as “things that are variously materialized” (Knuutilla 
2005: 1266), and uses this to attend to their epistemic capacities.47 Ultimately, like experimental 
systems in the laboratory, models are “epistemic tools” (Knuuttila 2011: 267):  
Approaching models as epistemic artifacts draws attention to both their intentional and material 
dimensions from the interplay of which their epistemic qualities arise. Models gain their inten-
tionality by being constructed, used, and interpreted in purposeful human activities. On the other 
hand, there is nothing to use, construct, or interpret unless models are materialized in some 
medium. This material dimension of models makes them able to mediate and travel between 
different groups, epistemic activities, and disciplines […]. In fact, it is typical of modeling that 
the same computational templates travel across sciences (see Humphreys 2002, 2004). As they 
gain different interpretations and uses, they become part of the embodiment of different models. 
(Knuuttila 2006: 50) 
                                                 
47 With epistemic tools she builds on earlier accounts of models as independent entities, like Morgan and Morrison 
(see part 5.1.2.) and the common interest of these approaches in the construction and use of models (cf. Knuuttila: 
2011:266). Her focus on the material, “tangible” dimensions of models is complementing these earlier accounts 
(cf. ibid: 267): “Without materiality mediation is empty” (Knuuttila 2005: 1266). 
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They distribute epistemic agency, e.g. in making processes mathematically dressed in differen-
tial equations legible for human interpreters. 
In several of the interviews the models were explicitly described as tools, each setting a slightly 
different accent. Comparable to Knuuttila’s concept of epistemic tools, seeing models as a tool 
“to make something understandable” is given as an alternative to seeing them as a direct repre-
sentation of reality which would be problematic (fieldnotes, 11.12.2017). As tools, models are 
used to systematize the ruminations over a problem. But, differing from Knuuttila’s concern 
with the materiality of models, seeing models as tools is rooted in their symbolic nature in 
relation to the world: 
For me it is important, that a model is as abstract as possible while still reflecting those qualities 
of reality I want to think about. That means, for me a model is a tool generating understanding 
as well as discourse. […] Ultimately, they are complex symbols for things and relations in the 
world on the basis of which you can talk about the world. And in that sense they are good or 
bad, in how far they have something to do with the world and in how they help to communicate 
about the world. (01/02/2018, 250-258) 
In particular, they help communicate about the world because they serve as a basis to develop 
narratives to think through and talk about certain scenarios (see also part 5.3.2.):  
Models help to call forth associations, which is great, because for one, generate understanding 
in basic physics, which is important for the scientific community, because as a side effect new 
methods and model components are developed that other people can use. And at the same time 
you generate narratives you can use to think through certain scenarios. Models help you think, 
in a way. As a graphic or visual way to illustrate certain processes. (31/01/2018, 113-119)  
In the understanding of the research group, models were tools in a straightforward sense of 
lending aid or assistance. I will get to the visual aspect mentioned in the previous quote in the 
next section. However, the concept of epistemic tools grants the models an agential status of 
their own in the process of knowledge production, especially because they are not “the model” 
but as Knuuttila called it “variously materialized” as different “representational means”.48 Rep-
resentational means can be ways of relating model and target system, such as simplifications or 
approximations, but also ways of visualizing the model:  
                                                 
48 With her focus on concrete representational means, Knuuttila wants to attend to “the paradoxical nature of 
modeling” (2006:42), which is constituted through the representational as well as pragmatic or performative as-
pects of modeling. She takes the difference in earlier philosophical approaches to modeling – that lingered on 
representation as the source of knowledge through models – as her starting point to describe representation as 
becoming relevant at certain points of modeling practices: as a practice of building models and as only one among 
many uses of models (cf. Knuuttila 2005: 1260-1268, 2011): “Thus, being productive things created by represen-
tation, simulation models question the distinction between the performative and representational conceptions of 
science and challenge us to approach representation performatively. From this point of view, representation is less 
a relation to be aspired to by philosophical analysis than an important object of factual knowledge itself.” (Knuut-
tila 2006: 53). With “performative conceptions” she refers to the work of Ian Hacking and Andrew Pickering, but 
her argument could also have implications for further research in a material-semiotic stance, potentially enabling 
a productive connection between questions of representation and questions of practice. 
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[O]n the one hand the representational means impose their own constraints on the model design, 
yet on the other hand they facilitate the results derived from it […]. More generally, it seems 
that the wide variety of representational means modelers make use of i.e. diagrams, pictures, 
scale models, symbols, natural language, mathematical notations, 3D images on screen all afford 
and limit scientific reasoning in their characteristic ways. (Knuuttila 2011: 267f) 
I spelled out a similar point with the notion of different model formats which need to be aligned 
through practices of simplification, experimentation and visualization. Consequently, each 
model format is a slightly different epistemic tool, and a certain degree of misalignment can be 
productive. The model formats I have focused on so far were the computational model and the 
mathematical model, and I briefly touched on the mental model and visual model formats – 
diagrams and plots of model output. Mathematical models enable the skilled user to grasp 
model components and their relationship with one glance. They are potentially the most “con-
densed” model format. Computational models spell the models out in great detail, a practice 
that can be described as “story telling with code” (Gramelsberger 2010: 170, see also Gramels-
berger 2011) and, as I have shown in part 5.2.1., they respond to the modeler with error mes-
sages, becoming an active counterpart in model construction. Thus, computational models at 
the same time encrypt and spell out model processes. These processes and the behavior of the 
model over time are made visible by model plots. In the next section I will focus on visualization 
as a practice and a model format.  
 
5.3. Visualization 
The student was almost finished with his model. He had identified a research gap and 
decided on a research question as well as on the processes to include. He had performed 
a number of experiments through parameter runs on his computer. He had introduced 
a new parameter to capture certain characteristics of digital social networks. Finally, 
he was at a point where the model structure was clear and it became a matter of begin-
ning experiments with additional components. He would have to do the necessary pa-
rameter runs on the cluster. Yet first, he presented the state of his work to his supervisor 
and later to the team. We met at the supervisor’s office at 10 am, and when everyone 
had arrived a few minutes later, the student opened his laptop, summarized what he had 
done since the last meeting and then began to explain the model’s structure. “This is 
still very simplified”, he admitted. His supervisor frowned at the defensiveness: “We do 
take the real world as inspiration, but in the model we can do what is interesting and 
what we want, independent from that. That is the beauty of physics.”  
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The student nodded and continued his presentation with three plots in black and white 
that showed how the parameter he had introduced influenced opinion dynamics. The 
lower it is the more opinions coexist over the course of a simulation. When it is high, 
consensus happens. He had chosen the plots carefully out of a number of parameter 
runs and contrasting them with each other illustrated the basic process of the model. 
They look almost elegant, I thought. Especially when the student showed some plots 
from an older paper he referenced and said: “those are quite ugly, to be honest”. Still, 
also those plots worked through contrast and comparison.  
The student called our attention to a particular phenomenon that at least for me was 
almost lost behind the obvious “it boils down to two or three opinion groups”: For 
certain runs, two main groups formed with smaller subgroups of different opinions in 
the immediate proximity. They continued to discuss the meaning of the plots, tracing the 
various lines with their fingers on the screen.  
Then the student showed us a beautiful, colorful plot. It was a combination of 50 model 
runs, an ensemble run, and he had added some other plots to it. The plot was dominated 
by a dark blue morphing into a lighter green. Three additional graphs were in a con-
trasting orange, differentiated by the quality of the line. A fourth graph was added in 
Figure 6: Model plots (fieldnotes 31/01/2018). Reproduced with permission. 
Figure 7: Model plots (cf. Carletti 2006: 226). 
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white. Outside the diagram four different measuring scales were indicated. He zooms 
closer into the plot: “Basically, this sums up my work”, he quips. 
From what I could gather, the plot showed how when the value of one particular pa-
rameter is increased, the number of opinion groups concentrates around a small part 
of all the possible opinions, almost leading to a consensus. The student explained the 
plot and that he had subsequently introduced another parameter which “led to a shift 
in the attractor state”. I had only a vague idea what he meant, but I saw the difference 
when he quickly jumped back and forth between three different versions of the plot: The 
part where the two thicker lines ran together in the middle shifted further and further to 
the right. The student summed his presentation up by explaining which other parameters 
and types of agents he wants to include in the model to experiment with. He ended with: 
“If I still have time, I also want to try out what happens, if the agents prioritize certain 
opinions. But, I mean, the qualitative result is already there, so…” 
They began to discuss details. The student pointed to a bump in one of the lines he did 
not know how to interpret. The supervisor suspected that it was due to too few parameter 
runs: since he had done only 50 runs, the error margin would probably still be rather 
large. It actually could correspond to that bump. He indicated the possible span of the 
margin with his fingers on the screen.   
Then the supervisor turned his attention to the model equations: “Did you let the model 
run long enough? Because these suggest that after a while actual consensus happens, 
not just almost, as it is the case here:” The student agreed: “That is something I want 
to take care of with the runs on the cluster. On my laptop, as it is, one model run already 
takes at least half an hour. Do you have any practical suggestions how I could save time 
Figure 6: Ensemble run (fieldnotes 31/01/2018). Reproduced with permission. 
45 
 
here?” “What language did you use?” “Python.” The supervisor looked at the model 
code: “You can always try and leave out low level statements like ‘print’, those usually 
are too slow.” The student nodded: “Yes, I could try that. And do I need to worry about 
using code packages like Numpy? Would it be better if I wrote that part of the code 
myself?” “That particular package is reliable enough. Everybody uses it, so don’t worry 
about it. You have enough things to do as it is. By the way, there is this empirical study 
that actually tries to measure the parameter you introduced in the data. You should take 
a look at that. I’ll email it to you. Remind me, if I haven’t done that by tomorrow.”   
At the end of the meeting, the supervisor cautioned the student not to lose sight of his 
central research question, even though he could certainly do a lot of interesting things 
with his model, now that it was working: “In any case, you're on track with what you're 
doing, to compare and discuss differences that follow the introduction of other model 
components. Actually, a model only makes sense in relation to other models, because 
they really don't depict reality, anyways.” 
The following week, the student gave a presentation of his work in front of the team. He 
talked freely, supported by presentation slides containing mainly plots, but also illus-
trative images, numbers and equations, as well as a diagram of model components and 
an enumeration of the modeling steps that had to be performed with each simulation. 
He used the same plots as before. Additionally, he had actually found a storyline and a 
series of drawings, like a comic strip, to illustrate his model. He used colors to mark 
correspondences between the images and his plots. The drawing was adapted from an 
older paper on a similar subject, which in return had been adapted from another source 
– the agenda setting paper for the matter at hand, actually. Mostly, he put two different 
kinds of visualizations next to each other on one slide – juxtaposing drawing and equa-
tions, equations and plots. And finally, to make sense of what the plot showed, he put 
plot and drawing next to each other. All the time the colors connected the corresponding 
elements in two images.  
 
5.3.1. “And then at first you try to observe interesting emergent phenomena.” 
Even though a model is never really done, at a certain point it is done enough to “observe 
interesting phenomena” – The verb used in this phrase indicates the importance of model output 
as visually accessible data, usually as diagrams or plots. This quote from one of the modelers 
when asked how he would define modeling underlines this: “It is the depiction of processes that 
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happen in nature, for example, or social processes or something. And to depict them in a metric 
which we are able to perceive somehow, such as numbers” (M4: 23). 
In this section, I will focus on visualization – both as practice and model formats. In the first 
part, I will describe how plots are used and embedded in other model formats before I will come 
to the “interesting phenomena” they make visible. I will focus on plots here, even though dif-
ferent kinds of visualizations played a role in my research.49 The second part is about the ways 
of relating model and world in the research group which can involve visualizations, but do not 
necessarily have to.  
Visualization is an integral practice of alignment because visualizations make visible align-
ments as well as misalignments: a plot of implausible output makes visible at a glance that 
mental model, mathematical model and computational model format are misaligned, even 
though technically, the code is correct. The story illustrated some of the many ways in which 
visualizations are used in everyday modeling practices and in the communication about the 
model and its results. 
Different kinds of plots, like ensemble runs, state space plots, bifurcation diagrams or simple 
graphs are the most common way of presenting the results of the model runs. Especially when 
combined with each other they make model dynamics visible at a glance. Thus, every compu-
tational model included a plotting function to create these plots after each run:  
                                                 
49 Four kinds of visualizations were relevant: the ones produced ad hoc in interviews or supervision situations 
(though often building on earlier experiences of visualizing a model), the plots produced en masse for parameter 
runs and the ones then reproduced (or chosen) for a paper, the team or the public as a basis for discussion and 
evidence in support of an argument, and visualizations of model dynamics in causal loop diagrams. 
Figure 7: Screenshot of a plotting function (16/01/2018/. Reproduction without permission, thus blurred.  
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And then you have helping functions. One function counts how many opinions still exist in the 
model, another one counts, how many edges between different opinions exist, how strong plu-
rality is, so to speak. […]. Then you have the so-called main function putting it all together […]. 
And then there is always something visualizing the whole thing, how it behaves over time for 
example. […] And you always try to find something two-dimensional, with two axis, because 
that is easiest to grasp visually. (31/01/2018, 378-387) 
These plots seldom appear alone – neither in code nor in papers or presentations. They are at 
least accompanied by explanatory texts. Often, several plots of the same kind are contrasted, or 
plots of different kinds are used to explain each other.50  
Using contrasting colors and clear lines, plots have a certain aesthetic appeal. Hence, they could 
be analyzed like other images from a variety of theoretical perspectives (cf. e.g. Günzel et al. 
2014), focusing on their non-verbal efficacy and “obstinacy” the iconic turn calls us to attend 
to (cf. Schulz 2009: 11), but also focusing on their specificity as diagrams: “Images are looked 
at, diagrams are read. Their legibility implies familiarity with its underlying syntactic and se-
mantic rules” (Beck/ Wöpking 2014:  347). 
Diagrams and plots as they are used here can be seen as “hybrids” of script and image (cf. 
Mersch 2015: 104).51 A broad body of literature on techno-scientific images illustrates how 
these are bound up in specific practices, fulfil a certain purpose and require a specific kind of 
“skilled vision” (Grasseni 2007)52 to appreciate and interpret them (e.g. cf. Bredekamp et al. 
2015, Daston/ Galison 2017, Liebsch/ Mößner 2012, Reichle et al. 2008 ). Early laboratory 
studies have also concentrated on visual material produced in their field (Knorr-Cetina 1999, 
Latour/ Woolgar 1986). The abundance and importance of plots makes visualization a distin-
guishing feature of simulation modeling: 
Whereas telescopes and microscopes render phenomena visible by affecting the scale of ‘tangi-
ble’ entities through optical processes of resolution, simulation renders 'visible' the effects of 
parameters and forces such as time, dynamic interactions, and so forth that are not dealt with by 
optics related transformations. Thus, simulation, by constructing images, may translate abso-
lutely non-visual events into a visual media! Often there is no opportunity to compare simulated 
images with the original - there may be no possible perspective from which to view things like 
this, or it may even be that the depicted material does not exist in the real world. Hence, simu-
lations may equip virtual worlds with visual and other qualities that do not mirror those of real-
world processes. (Küppers et al. 2006: 8) 
Because plots either by themselves or combined with each other make visible otherwise non-
visible, sometimes surprising processes within a model, they play an important part in aligning 
model formats and can be seen as one themselves. After the presentation described in the story, 
I inquired after the meaning of the blue ensemble run plot: “It’s not that difficult, actually. Here, 
                                                 
50 I do not know how much influence the modeler has on the design of a plot that is made by a plotting function. 
51 He uses the difficult to translate term “Schriftbildlichkeit” – “script-image-ness” to capture this.  
52 The concept of skilled vision captures learning to look as an apprenticeship which like other scientific practices 
happens between standardization and personal experience: “skilled visions are the result of concrete processes of 
education of attention, within situated practices and ecologies of culture” (Grasseni 2007: 7)   
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at x you have the values of the parameter U, the opinions. Then I took U=1, let it run 50 times 
and plotted every single opinion in here.” The student continued to explain it and finished with 
“And then it produces quite an interesting image in the end” (06/02/2018, 24-26). 
But what qualifies as “interesting image” or “interesting emergent phenomena”? “Interesting” 
as an evaluation indicates a disciplinary learning process, and is highly context-dependent. In 
the research group, it was often used to characterize counter-intuitive, mathematical phenom-
ena. So, when something looks "interesting" it could mark the point where “matter really mat-
ters” (Hastrup 2013: 5), or “the world kicks back” (Barad 1996: 188). Or, more precisely, where 
a certain disciplining teaches to let the world kick back in a certain way, e.g. through parameter 
runs. At one instance, a supervisor proposed to their student: “you could test this parameter 
continuously. The results for 1 and 0 will be trivial, but in-between it is going to be interesting. 
That’s how you would do it in physics, test each parameter systematically for itself” (fieldnotes, 
10/01/2018). 
Because plots and other visualizations cause and support moments of interest, like the ensemble 
run plot I replicated in the story at the beginning of this section, they were used repeatedly in 
different contexts – as allies to support an argument, as “immutable mobiles” (cf. Latour 1986: 
5f).53 Choosing the right plot out of the numerous plots produced by the many parameter runs 
to stand for the model in public is another crucial bifurcation. Thus the student’s quip in the 
story about one plot basically summing up his work hit the nail on the head.  
But if it is true that “[o]ften there is no opportunity to compare simulated images with the orig-
inal - there may be no possible perspective from which to view things like this, or it may even 
be that the depicted material does not exist in the real world” (Küppers et al 2006: 8), how then 
do the modelers make the connection between model and world? With this question I come to 
the last part. 
 
5.3.2. “And in the end, ideally, you are able to observe structures that you can also observe 
in the system you really want to study.” 
How to characterize the relationship between model and target was a source of tension in the 
research group. Working with conceptual models was a concession to the difficulties of mod-
eling social processes (see part 6.2.). Still, the question remained, whether comprehensive mod-
els of reality are possible and desirable as a middle- to long-term goal for their collective efforts. 
                                                 
53 In ANT, immutable mobiles are “objects which have the properties of being mobile, but also immutable, pre-
sentable, readable and combinable with one another” (Latour 1986: 7, emphasis in the original). They are powerful 
allies in making an argument because of the simple mechanism of “I will show you” (ibid: 14). 
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In the meantime, however, they agreed on relating model and world through “narratives”. In 
this part I will focus on how, when the model formats are more or less aligned, visualizations 
become the predominant model format: plots, visual illustrations and “narratives” understood 
as non-visual illustration are made to work together to make sense of model dynamics and to 
present “the model” to others. 
In section 5.1.2. I have already mentioned the imagery used to characterize the relationship 
between model and world. Conceptual models are not predictive or realistic in the sense of 
attempting an exact description of the world. Still, they were supposed to render central pro-
cesses intelligible: “Especially dealing with complex systems, a model is not enough to describe 
a system, but you learn to understand it. And in the field I am working in I don’t see any models 
to describe a reality completely, at least not yet. Maybe that will be the case in the future” 
(06/02/2018, 24-26). 
With this, the models made an – albeit limited – claim to realism: They were supposed to be 
“as abstract as possible while still reflecting qualities of reality” (01/02/2018, 250-251), “the 
relevant aspects” (06/02/2018, 50) the “characteristic, key figures” (31/01/2018, 86). Compre-
hending dynamics within the model became possible precisely because of their simplicity. Fi-
nally because of this claim to limited correspondence, “reality” hopefully became fathomable: 
“Ultimately, you can build infinitely complex models, but in the end the question is what the 
added value would be if you then understood the model as little as the reality which you want 
to describe, yes, but also want to explain” (23/01/2018, 144-146). 
Even though the modelers had to quantify within the model and formulated a need for quanti-
fiable, generalizable results in the future, conceptual models allow for qualitative rather than 
quantitative observations: “In none of our models we claim to predict something […]. But we 
are able to generate understanding of processes, which are not directly visible, I would say. 
Certain non-linearities, feedbacks. And you can roughly estimate orders of magnitude” 
(16/01/2018b, 183-188). This caused ambivalent attitudes towards direct model applicability: 
In my view, I am still able to grasp the essential processes in a model. You have something like 
a skeleton, quantified, but still describing essential things. And in the end it allows an interpre-
tation, or re-transformation to the real-world system. Even though, in the case of our strongly 
simplified social-ecological models it is questionable whether this is even possible. 
(16/01/2018a, 44-50) 
The research group bridged this gap with a recourse to so-called “narratives”: generalizable 
kinds of stories the models support. In the story introducing this section the student used differ-
ent kinds of visualizations – plots and drawings telling a story – to literally illustrate the narra-
tive connecting model and world. These narratives were meant to provoke discussions and re-
actions inside and outside of the academic community because like the plots, they illustrated 
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model dynamics for people unfamiliar with mathematical or computational models. In them, a 
connection between world and model was carefully, but also normatively articulated. The fol-
lowing example illustrates this point.  
A more experienced modeler explained to me how he had tried out a new idea for network 
model of opinion dynamics, based on a problem a standard version had: after a while inevitably 
every agent had the same opinion or a completely different one. Either way, communication 
between them stopped. Already a very simple, first implementation of this idea, where an agent 
is a node in different networks instead of just one, produced a surprising result:  
In that case I was really surprised, because I didn’t expect this to happen, something comparable, 
yes, but not this particular kind of state. […] Take this scenario, for example: In the beginning 
there are eight different opinions in each network. And then it runs for a while and then you 
have six, then only five, and at some point only two opinions. Until the end of all days you have 
two, it does not sink to one. That is the punch line. […] The plurality remains, but microscopi-
cally a lot changes during the whole amount of time. (31/01/2018, 404-419)  
Already at this early stage the phenomenon was made sense of through a narrative, possibly 
aligning mental model and computational model format: “And this is such a narrative, that you 
need different levels to secure plurality. If everybody only stays within their own network it 
might not be good for plurality and exchange of opinions, so to speak” (31/01/2018, 347-350). 
This result was thrilling and later in the interview he emphasized again: “intuitively, this was 
not to be expected, at least from the point of view of models. […] Suddenly, something com-
pletely new emerged” (31/01/2018, 427-431). He added: “What you observe in systems out 
there is the existence of a plurality of opinions. It simply is like that. And this is also a qualitative 
observation, I wouldn’t even need to quantify that” (31/01/2018, 469-472). 
For the research group, these qualitative statements and narratives present a way of coming to 
terms with the difficulties of modeling what they deem social processes:  
While natural fields are describable for the larger part with physical equations – or at least in 
theory, if we would know them all – this is not always the case for social areas. Of course, you 
can find certain rules and write certain simulations, but that is far less predicative […]. And you 
can make both areas compatible when you indeed describe them on different levels. You could 
use the result from the simulation of melting ice shields, for example, as an input variable for 
the human system. This, you can model with a network. But then you have to keep in mind that 
it is only telling a narrative. And then, you put this variable ‘melting ice’ in there, a bit artifi-
cially, and then observe the human system for swings of opinion, for example. (19/01/2018, 
128-136) 
In the last section I will describe assumptions about “the social” and “social processes” as well 




6. Problematization: Considering Ontology in Modeling “the Social” 
Until now I have not explicitly dealt with model content, other than stating that for the research 
group developing models and a modeling framework of socio-ecological processes relevant on 
a global scale constituted the over-arching aim, while at the same time the individual modelers 
worked with simple, conceptual models. Two of those exclusively captured social processes, 
while several others included a renewable or finite energy resource.54  
Due to the diversity of models, I did not delve as deep into their content as I would have liked 
to during my fieldwork. Instead, I decided to focus on a more general grasp on modeling prac-
tices in the group. Still, epistemic assumptions about “the social” and related concepts, their 
representation, operationalization and efficacy remained an important focal point in my consid-
erations. Therefore I decided to include this final part into my thesis which together with the 
part on bifurcation as a research perspective frames the main part on modeling practices. Nev-
ertheless, as the title indicates, I want the following to be understood only as a tentative prob-
lematization that is still very much a “work in progress”. 
First, I will try to untangle some assumptions about the social, especially how it is conceived 
in relation to ecology. Then, I will distinguish between three kinds of difficulties the research 
group associates with modeling social processes, most prominently feedback loops between a 
model and the processes it is supposed to describe. Finally, I will problematize assumptions and 
the feedback problem using Paul Kockelman’s (2013, 2017) proposal for a “Bayesian Anthro-
pology”. 
 
6.1. Assumptions about “the Social” 
In the mental maps of the subjective perception of the research group the modelers usually 
delineated different thematic or methodical entities from each other, as well as people or mod-
els, depending on what was relevant to the individual person. They were drawn either as spheres 
or as nodes in a network and connected through overlaps or lines. Within those maps, they made 
no verbal connection like socio-ecology or something comparable.55 Instead, if themes were 
differentiated, two to four were made out. Mostly, they separated a social, a natural and an 
economic sphere from each other. One sphere was always related to “nature”, “environment”, 
“biophysical processes”, sometimes more specifically the “CO2-cycle” – or more generally the 
                                                 
54 Two modelers worked on mainly “biophysical” processes, but they also had a more “hybrid” status concerning 
their involvement in this and other research groups, which is why I will focus on the other models here.  
55 One map stood out because in depicting a coordinate system where different actors were positioned it considered 
ranges and fluid borders. Still, the fact that its dimensions were “social” “economic” and “environmental” makes 
it a case in point. Stylistically, they were remarkably similar to the mental maps of the models which indicates 
how they are rooted in a specific thought style and thought collective (see part 5.1.1.). 
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“Earth System”. The other spheres were often “the social” and sometimes additionally “eco-
nomics” or socio-cognitive processes like “opinion dynamics” or “learning”. In the group dis-
cussion at the end somebody pinpointed this as “for us it is also the question of what there is 
beyond economic behavior”. Taken together, the maps make visible a modern nature-culture 
divide, albeit a bit blurry. 
In contrast, in answers to the interview question “what is the goal of the research group?” con-
cepts like the Anthropocene, interactions or coevolutions etc. were explicitly named:  
The point for the research group is that you can’t take humanity out of the equation of the natural 
system. The Anthropocene principle is that humanity is such an important part of our climate 
system that it doesn’t make sense to model the thing without it. And so we try, maybe a bit 
blurry to approach stuff that has been sidelined in the big models. (18/01/2018b, 41-47) 
In any case, for me it is decisive that this idea of human-environment-interaction is more 
strongly considered in models. And that means not only to ask how people influence the envi-
ronment, but also to consider the other direction. To look at that with tools such as networks, 
ABMs and stuff is the core for me. (23/01/2018, 56-60) 
However, on a more basic (ontological?) level, even these concepts were employed in relation 
to a dichotomy, or rather, several dichotomies: social system – climate system; deciding sub-
jects – determined environment, natural components – social components: 
Our aim is to get a better understanding of how humanity, or the whole social system as the 
opposite pole to the climate system behaves in interaction with the earth system, the climate 
system. And how to approach the discussion surrounding the Anthropocene from the natural 
sciences. And we decided to take the path of co-evolutionary modeling and analy-
sis.(31/01/2018, 161-166) 
At the same time it was clear that the implication of the Anthropocene is that not everything 
fits into these oppositions anymore. This was expressed in terms of social metabolism, for ex-
ample in reference to the work of Marina Fischer-Kowalski et al. (e.g. 2011):  
At the research institute there is a trend to focus on metabolisms, material and energy flows 
between society and nature. Also historically, which factors, like sedentism, urbanization, and 
so on, impacted these flows […] and this is a try to transfer social sciences onto natural science 
questions. (13/02/2018, 195-203) 
But this “diagnosis of hybridity” (see footnote 11), became – again– a problem of delineation:  
The way I perceive it, social metabolism is a thing that is human as well as natural. And then 
you get into trouble, like, where is the separation now? And isn’t everything ‘Anthropocene’ 
now? That is the beauty of mathematics, I have my agents, my environments etc. and that is 
that. (18/01/2018a, 151-155) 
Before I go deeper into the issue of clearly separating a social, a natural and a hybrid sphere, I 
want to bring out (1) what actually was subsumed under the umbrella of “the social” or “social 
processes” and (2) the difficulties of modeling this that the research group made explicit. In 
some interviews, being social was explicitly limited to people and their interactions: 
I: Another question: what do you mean with ‘social’ when you talk about ‘social networks‘? 
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Human interaction. Yes. Human micro processes. That you look at people at all, basically.  
I: That means humans are through and through social beings? […] 
I mean, if you take a closer look, there are processes inside a person that are not social, but 
physical. But in my case, when it is about opinion dynamics, it doesn’t play into it. […] Even 
though, it is also a social reaction, if somebody next to you smells really bad and you move 
away from them. Actually that is all social stuff: What leads to an exchange of opinion, and 
what does it look like? (06/02/2018, 327-330, 337-345)  
In practice, in the networks of ABMs a node could be an individual person, like in the example 
stories introducing the earlier sections of this work. But they could also stand for a household, 
or a farmer and some land on a geographic network, as this mental map illustrates.56  
That particular model seemed to me to be relatively balanced concerning socio-ecological pro-
cesses. Still, even in this model, decisions were made by the person: “Of course it somehow is 
a unity, the field and the deciding agent. It belongs together, but the function of the decision 
describes a person, or a household or something like that, and there I would make a strong 
separation to a nonliving nature, which reacts instead of acts” (23/01/2018, 227-230) 57 
Another model described society as the sum of individual people aggregated in institutions and 
political parties: 
                                                 
56 Nodes can also be geographical points in the climate system or a network can describe traffic infrastructure, to 
name but two examples. Mathematically, a network is a very abstract entity described by two sets, as can be seen 
in the mental map in the top right corner. 
57 Even though the decisions made are subject to a form of “bounded rationality”, it is described as socially, not 
ecologically bounded: “it is not a process, where agents simply say ‘I will do this’, but it has a strong social 
component” (23/01/2018, 176-178). 
Figure 8 Mental map of a model (23/01/2018). Reproduced with permission.  
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You break up the social fabric into some sort of pyramid. […]. You have individuals that are 
affected by something happening in their environment […]. The question is, whether then some-
thing ‘more tangible’ forms, maybe interest groups, organizations, political parties […] that in 
turn are also connected with each other. (31/01/2018, 268-277)  
As a fruit of their interdisciplinary composition, the group also discussed ideas of social strati-
fication – class, agency and class-bound agency, as well as bounded rationality – all within the 
structure-agency-paradigm (cf. e.g. Ortner 2006 for an extensive discussion of this opposition).  
Looking at the group’s model portfolio and assuming a complex systems perspective, for me 
the question arose whether for them “the social” emerged from the complex system or whether 
the micro processes within a system were “social”. I posed this question in the group discussion 
concluding my data collection. After some discussion, one answer was that it was both, but that 
given enough data and a better comprehension of the processes, “the social” or “society” is 
ultimately reducible to social micro-processes and then describable through ABMs, for exam-
ple: “But I think in the end, the emerging social is all reducible to micro-processes of behavior 
in the models. The only thing is that the way it emerges is unpredictable” (fieldnotes 
26/02/2018).  
This corresponds to how social processes were thought of as statistical processes, in which case 
the emergence of social groups became a case of statistical clusters. Modeling these clusters 
again would then be a matter of available data: “In the end, what I do amounts to a cluster 
analysis, and we discussed whether it makes sense at all, to open drawers and sort individuals 
into them like this and then see what happens. That is of course a questionable approach” 
(13/02/2018, 136-140). Still, these emerging macro phenomena are not “the social”, in the sense 
of social theory building on the Durkheim’s oeuvre. The idea that the social is reducible to 
micro-processes is opposed to his conception of the social as a reality sui generis: [Social facts] 
are general among, external to, independent of, and constraining upon particular individuals 
[…]. They constitute a distinct level of reality and are not reducible to the meeting of individual 
intentions” (Lukes 2015: 701).  
For modeling this implies that from an empirical, social anthropological perspective, there is 
no “point zero” where un-socialized, bare agents interact. “The social” is always already acting 
and enacted, changing and changed by agents and their practices. Phrased differently, one could 
say the social becomes an agent (in the ABM-sense of the term) in its own right and needs to 
be included as such.58  
                                                 
58 Interrogating the individualism inherent in ABMs, Brian Epstein also concludes that “in light of the nonlocal 
and cross-level dependence of social entities I suggest that true micro-foundations – even computational and non-
reductive ones – are a pipe dream” (Epstein 2012: 133) and suggests to include macroscopic properties of a system 
in question already in the model scenario. 
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6.2. Difficulties in Modeling “the social” 
From the point of view of the modelers, several difficulties of modeling social processes be-
came apparent in interviews and observations. All issues were again formulated in reference to 
and delineation of concepts of “nature”. These difficulties are reducible to three aspects: (1) the 
challenges of interdisciplinary research, (2) a lack of quantifiable data, and (3) feedback loops. 
I will only briefly touch upon the first two issues here and take up the third problem again in 
the following part. 
Interdisciplinary research and research into interdisciplinary problems was seen as challenging: 
“A big challenge are the different groups involved, social scientists and physicists, accompa-
nied by different approaches, and that is a difficulty”  (06/02/2018, 47-49). As I already dis-
cussed in part 5.1.1, it confronts the physicists in the group with other ways of doing and writing 
about science. One problem here was dealing with a certain ambiguity: the existence of several 
valid positions next to each other. Additionally, they noted that social sciences do not attempt 
to give a general theory of social dynamics, not even hypothetically:  
So, I haven’t found it yet, the generally established theory of social dynamic and in my obser-
vation, in the way science is approached this is not what the typical social sciences are after. 
[…] I mean, there is not nothing. But even the range of relevant communities still not covers 
what we attempt to do. And that certainly is a challenge or source of tension. (18/01/2018a, 19-
26) 
This leads to a lack of data in a format usable for modeling: quantifiable, aggregated and com-
patible with data in physics: 
A huge difficulty that I wasn’t aware of in the beginning was quantification. For biophysical 
processes there is a higher degree of objectivity, I believe, or whatever you want to call it. […] 
the knowledge has another quality, and independence from the observer. And yes, there are 
certain biological, physical, chemical processes and of course, a model may not work because 
you forgot something […]. But concerning the observer, there are no feedback loops, the climate 
system does not change because we observe it. […] And I think that that is different on a social 
level.  (16/01/2018a, 66-75) 
Acknowledging the situatedness of the social cast doubts whether this kind of data is even at-
tainable: 
A lot of individual things and interactions in the social system have been well described, and 
the question is how, if at all, you can aggregate that sensibly. That is the difficulty, to make this 
compatible with quantified observations in the climate system, in the level of aggregation as 
well in the depth of understanding them. And then of course, it depends from a lot of factors, 
somehow… local factors play into it, and fluctuations in time. (31/01/2018, 181-187) 
The previous quote already mentions the third problem the modelers identified: feedback loops. 
Their idea of feedback is that people are going to react in one way or another to their inclusion 
in a model. This leads to such a deep change in people’s actions, mental models etc. that the 
basic modeling assumptions as well as the model output are not adequate anymore: 
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If you include people, then they also have mental models, and when you build a model it can 
lead to a change in that mental model and the people’s behavior. So, I think that this is a big 
challenge that you at least consider that models don’t just depict reality but in the case of systems 
involving people they can also create reality. (23/01/2018: 65-70)  
The biggest difference concerning modeling is […] that nature doesn’t care about the assump-
tions you make about it. And people almost certainly are going to react when you tell them ‘you 
will behave in such and such a way’. (01/02/2018, 18-21) 
An attempt by the research group to solve all three of these issues was the development of a 
modeling framework, containing a number of components and methods to build models with. 
The framework could be used by other disciplines, addressing the problem of interdiscipli-
narity; it could be used to generate more quantitative data or building on quantitative data not 
directly accessible for them, dealing with the problem of a lack thereof; and it could maybe 
even be flexible and mobile enough to be adaptable to feedbacks within and outside the models. 
One of the modelers stressed emphatically that the framework was not just a “toolbox” contain-
ing model components/ entities, but that they had developed a new fundamental method of 
linking model components: 
Framework for me means two things. For one, it is this construction kit, with which I mean the 
concrete components, for another there is more abstractly the way these components can be 
connected […] concerning the programming, that is not easy […]. And in the framework there 
is this very elegant way of solving this by adding and subtracting certain terms independent 
from whether a certain component exists at that moment or not. That sounds very abstract but it 
is actually widely applicable. (31/01/2018, 208-224) 
At the beginning, this way of linking components was grounded in Python as a programming 
language, which made it easier to express it, which became obvious when translating the frame-
work into C++, another programming language: 
In Python you can tell two different components ‘there is a resource’ and when you combine 
those components, there will be only one resource, not two. They refer to the same resource. 
And in C++ that is not that easy. And that is one of the finesses that is precisely the cool thing 
about the framework, that in the case of the Python version this is a way of thinking and coding 
that goes beyond the framework itself. You could write completely different models with it […]. 
It is such a way of thinking that is totally cool and that could click with the whole physics 
community. (31/01/2018, 227-236) 
That way of linking components, called mixing, had already existed in computer sciences, but 
its application to modeling was new. The moment of abduction in this innovation prompted me 
to think differently through the problems explained above, in terms of inference and ontology. 
To me, it seemed to have a different kind of reach or generalizability than some of the other 
models I had encountered in my fieldwork. 
 
6.3. Thinking through Ontological Transformativities  
So far, modeling the social and the related practices and problems have been discussed on the 
level of available methods and data. Seen like this, modeling socio-ecological processes is 
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mainly a question of feasibility, and of epistemology: How, if at all, can I know the social 
through my model? But the feedback issue in modeling the social has ontological aspects be-
cause it makes explicit (1) how models may have deep implications for “what there is”, and (2) 
how there may be certain processes and effects models will not be able to grasp. 
This is related to my framing of modeling practices in terms of bifurcations as well as degrees 
of irreversibility and the questions asked in part 4: Why does it become harder at certain points 
to change a model’s structure? Which bifurcations are more crucial than others? Why are some 
new ideas and processes harder to introduce into a model than others? And when/ for which 
phenomena does it become necessary to build a wholly new framework?  
The main part of this work was able to provide some examples of bifurcations, like the choice 
of programming language or the kind of literature research performed, as well as the material-
semiotic practices they are embedded in. But what about bifurcations already in place before 
the process of model construction begins, through a person’s socialization or a discipline’s his-
tory? In a way, these bifurcations also socialize the models. This final part rests on the assump-
tion that the feedback problem as an onto-epistemological problem (Barad 2003, see footnote 
37) is precisely a case of such bifurcations made before even beginning to construct a single 
model. It means taking a step further away to try and understand what models in general can 
and cannot do. 
I refer to “ontology” as it is used in recent debates in anthropology and STS, where it is less 
about clear definitions of “what there is” and more about its contingency. These debates inquire 
into the pervasiveness, given-ness, mutability and contingency of the very fabric of the world 
and its intertwinement with our ways of perceiving, experiencing and ordering it. Are we meet-
ing the universe halfway (Barad 1996)? Have we ever been modern (Latour 2015)? And what 
is there beyond nature and culture (Descola 2013)? Those are just some interventions that 
sparked these discussions. And even though I will not go into them in detail,59 the fact that 
questioning the nature-culture divide (and all the other, smaller divides) in a number of ways is 
at the heart of these debates, is one reason why I choose to problematize the epistemological 
issue of “feedback loops in modeling the social” via ontology. 
Before I go into more detail, I want to emphasize that the following is not a suggestion for 
solving the feedback problem. On the contrary, as a problematization, it is another way of fram-
ing the problem.  
                                                 
59 These debates are often subsumed under the notion of an “ontological turn”, see Holbraad/ Pedersen 2016, and 
Jensen, Ballestero et al 2017 for detailed summaries and discussions. 
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I want to look at one particular attempt to theorize mathematics, computation, automation, in-
ferences, epistemology, ontology and feedback loops together: A paradigm the linguistic an-
thropologist Paul Kockelman (2013, 2017) called “Bayesian anthropology”. I am employing 
this particular theoretical framework here for four reasons:   
First, some of the modeling efforts I was able to observe or talk about in the interviews fit quite 
neatly into Kockelman’s schematization.60 Secondly, I think Kockelman’s framework helps to 
understand, why model construction and model alignment can become much more difficult, 
maybe even impossible for certain processes. Thirdly, the underlying assumptions in modeling 
the social are ontological and need to be problematized as such. Laying out a contrasting ontol-
ogy is one way to do this. Fourthly, while still very abstract, “Bayesian Anthropology” is more 
systematic and concrete than other interventions in relation to ontology and explicitly deals 
with automation and computation, with which I follow the field’s need for simplification and 
quantification to a certain extent. But it also addresses the limits of computation. 
Before I focus on his concept of “ontological transformativity”, I want to briefly describe how 
Kockelman situates his approach in anthropology. He departs from “the tension between rela-
tively reductive and nonreductive approaches to human behavior more generally” (2017: 146), 
e.g. in anthropology between structuralism and practice theory (cf. ibid: 147). Specifically, he 
thinks linguistic anthropology and computer science together, but makes a much more far-
reaching suggestion concerning the mediation of communication and information processing. 
He uses the image of the sieve as a very general way of information processing through sorting 
– something fits through it or it doesn’t. His example are the algorithms of spam filters based 
on Bayes’ Theorem of conditional probability. Sieves bring out similarities, patterns and pre-
dictability (cf. ibid: 171) and hence do work – much like epistemological tools. Information 
processing is understood as “the organization of complexity for the sake of predictability” 
(2013: 38). In that sense, models as epistemic tools are also sieves and process information or 
data.  
His fundamental point is that some information is easier to process automatically than others, 
because of the depth of the assumptions it potentially transforms. Some ways of processing 
information may even have fundamental effects in the world, like feedback loops. The central 
vanishing points from where he then differentiates these ways of processing information are 
                                                 
60 Even though the range of modeling approaches used in the research group made it difficult for me to go into in-
depth assumptions about the social in the last part, it now allows me a to generalize carefully. 
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“ontology (assumptions that drive interpretations) and inference (interpretations that alter as-
sumptions)” (Kockelman 2017: 173).61 Ways of processing information are ultimately modes 
of inference. Each mode of inference is able to grasp a certain kind of ontological transforma-
tivity “whereby an interpreting agent’s ontology transforms via mediated encounters with an 
individual.” (ibid: 180).62 Rephrasing his initial point this means that some ontological trans-
formations are more difficult to automate (e.g. compute or describe mathematically) than oth-
ers.  
He distinguishes five kinds of ontological transformativity that are characterized by the mode 
of inference needed to process them respectively (see Kockelman 2013: 44-48, 2017: 180-182 
for the following definitions). With each level of ontological transformativity, the ontological 
assumptions that are subject to change are deeper, leading to increasing ontological inertia. The 
difficulty to automate them increases as well: 
Finally, not only do these transformations exhibit different ontological inertias, they may also 
get progressively more difficult to mathematically formulate and technologically automate, and 
so the transformations in question seem to turn more and more on human based significance, 
and less and less on machine-based sieving. (Kockelman 2013: 48) 
The easiest kinds to grasp almost intuitively are the first and the fifth kind. The first level of an 
ontological transformation occurring is a simple causal process, causes may be natural or social: 
Something happens and turns one thing into another – predictable, stable and reliable, e.g. a 
chemical reaction, or a marriage ceremony that turns some man into a husband. The fifth level 
of ontological transformativity is what so far in this thesis has been discussed as “feedback 
loops”: Changes in an agent’s assumptions about a world may change the world about which 
the agent makes assumptions.63 
                                                 
61 He uses “ontology” very broadly: “Such a set of assumptions might be called a theory (when articulated in 
relation to a scientific institution, episteme, or disciplinary formation), a ground (in the way this term was used in 
chapter 5), a stereotype or prejudice (when negatively valenced), a likelihood (when framed mathematically), a 
heuristic (when framed qualitatively, or as a ‘rule of thumb’), an imaginary (when understood in relation to an 
underlying account or narrative about the prototypic entities involved in the domain being judged), a culture (when 
more or less intersubjectively shared by a group of people), and even a habitus or ‘sense’ (when understood as a 
tacit intuition regarding another’s identity via their techniques of the body, styles of speaking, and so forth). The 
term ontology functions as a cover- all term to capture the ramifications present in each of these framings” (Kockel-
man 2017: 177). 
62 He borrows his vocabulary from Peirce’ Semiotics, in order to remain abstract: index, kind, agent, individual, 
and ontology (see Kockelman 2017: 175 for definitions). Because I apply his framework to a rather concrete case 
here, I refrain from using these terms, even though this may limit its sweeping reach. Kockelman also means his 
categories to be complemented by others and “portable” (Kockelman 2013: 56). The confrontation with a particular 
empirical case may in turn transform the framework, in the way that ethnography brings theory and empirical data 
together in order to bifurcate concepts and generate better descriptions and understanding (cf. Strathern 2011, 
Hirschauer 2008).  
63 This issue has received some attention in STS, foremost by Ian Hacking. He described looping effects, e.g. 
between people and the development of a diagnosis in the medical sciences, that go beyond a change in mental 
models as they were described here to ways of how people are constituted in and constitute their very existence. 
Subsuming various empirical studies under the umbrella of an historical ontology, he writes: “Historical ontology 
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Once these two are clear the others are easily understood in more classic terms of inference: 
Deduction, induction and abduction. Kockelman uses Bayes’ Theorem of conditional probabil-
ity to illustrate these (I already mentioned it in the story introducing part 5.2.). This equation 
basically captures how an a priori-probability of something being the case is transformed into 
a different a posteriori-probability after the person (or agent) that assesses the a priori-proba-
bility has acquired an additional piece of information about that case. With this rather vague 
way of describing it I wanted only to highlight that Bayes’ Theorem is about a moment of 
transformation, namely ontological transformativity No. 2, or deductive inference.  
Transformativity no. 3 is the case of inductive reasoning, e.g. when data changes hypotheses 
or, to stay with the example, when the underlying statistical profile is changed and with it the 
likelihoods that were used to determine a priori and a posteriori probabilities).64 
In order to grasp transformativity No.4, abduction as a mode of inference is needed. Theories 
and data have to be related in unusual ways in order to deal with a surprising observation. In 
the case of Bayes’ Theorem, this means more fundamentally that it is not appropriate as a 
method to deal with a certain case anymore and another approach has to be used.  
                                                 
is about the ways in which the possibilities for choice, and for being, arise in history. It is not to be practiced in 
terms of grand abstractions, but in terms of the explicit formations in which we can constitute ourselves, […]. 
Historical ontology is not so much about the formation of character as about the space of possibilities for character 
formation that surround a person, and create the potentials for ‘individual experience.’ (Hacking 2002: 23). 
Kockelman himself focuses on the middle transformativities: “The first and last kinds of transformativity (1 and 
5), in various guises, have received a huge amount of attention in anthropology, and critical theory more generally. 
In contrast, the middle three transformativities (2– 4) are relatively under- theorized, and so will be the focus in 
what follows” (Kockelman 2017: 182) 
64 In statistics, broadly speaking, probability describes the outcome, and likelihood the values used to calculate it. 
Figure 9: Schematization of the five kinds of ontological transformativities (AK). 
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In order to apply this to my case, I want to recall the four reasons for going through all of this 
that I gave in the beginning: 
(1) The range of modeling practices, methods and models maps onto Kockelman’s schema-
tization to a certain extent. 
(2) The schema could also indicate why modeling some phenomena is harder than others or 
potentially impossible, simply put.  
(3) The underlying assumptions in modeling the social need to be problematized as ontolog-
ical assumptions. 
(4) Bayesian Anthropology is a systematic framework addressing automation and computa-
tion and their limits. 
While most of their models are conceptual and deductively inferred from theory, other models 
are built on the basis of large quantitative data sets and present a case of inductive inference (or 
both). The development of a new methodology with the modeling framework can be seen as an 
instance of abduction.  
However, the problem of feedback loops in modeling “the social” is either captured by the fifth 
kind of ontological transformativity, the kind that is impossible to compute, or by the fourth 
kind, where automation is a question of adequate methods and methodologies. Thus, the 
(im)possibility to model something depends on the kind of ontological transformativity and its 
accompanying type of inference. Bayesian Anthropology is a first step to recognize and sys-
tematize this in modeling as well as in anthropological knowledge production. Even though its 
operationalization is an open question, it sensitizes anthropologists and modelers alike for eval-
uating the adequacy of methodological approaches or models to certain questions, such as feed-
back effects, beyond “better” or “worse”. 
The ontological assumption in modeling the social that I want to address with this framework 
is its separation from other spheres like “ecology”, “environment”, “economy” or even “the 
hybrid”. What I want to problematize is this way of answering the Anthropocene – a profound 
ontological transformation – through further dissociations. The Anthropocene shakes these fun-
damental distinctions. That does not mean that for grappling with the first ontological trans-
formativities an assumption of separate spheres might not be helpful, or that I do not recognize 
the need for distinctions and clarity in order to build models. But the assumptions at stake in 
modeling socio-ecological transformations are fundamental.  
Bayesian Anthropology is not just a schematization, as a way of ordering “world” – an ontology 
– it also illustrates an alternative to interacting yet separate spheres like “social system” or 
“ecology”: instead of thinking in vertical “pillars of an Earth System”, where only one or two 
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pillars need to be modeled a bit more, it evokes thinking in horizontal layers of socio-ecological 
processes of varying ontological inertias and transformativities requiring different kinds of in-
ferences.65  
And in order to understand (and model, if you wish) what is happening in the Anthropocene, 
we need to deal with ontological assumptions of various depths. These depths require new and 
adapted ways of knowledge production, and modes of inference beyond induction and deduc-
tion especially in dealing with the so-called feedback problem or ontological transformativity 
no. 5. The question is then not if, but what anthropological methods and knowledge can con-
tribute (see also Palsson et al 2013), in a potentially collaborative or co-laborative way – “tem-
porary, non-teleological, joint epistemic work aimed at producing disciplinary reflexivities not 
interdisciplinary shared outcomes” (Niewöhner 2016: 2).  
I will end here because as stated in the beginning, this is supposed to be a problematization, a 
suggestion for another way of framing problems in modeling “the social”, not yet a fully devel-
oped research program. In practice, work on processes beyond the nature-culture divide is prob-
ably already happening in the research group and elsewhere. Further inquiry into modeling 
practices could hopefully show, how in everyday practices ontologies are already transformed. 
One would just have to know where and how to look – and maybe this means looking through 
a different framework.   
                                                 
65 From this ensues an exploration of socio-ecological processes as practices (as informing my research perspec-
tive, see part 4), as phenomena (in the sense of Barad 2012) or indeed as processes in an alternative conceptual-
ization e.g. as proposed by Alfred North Whitehead (1985 [1929], Stengers 2011). 
Figure 10: Schematization of socio-ecological processes and their transformativities (AK) 
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7. Summary and Outlook 
I have demonstrated how modeling can be understood as a continuous process of aligning dif-
ferent model formats almost completely, while each is contributing something particular to the 
model in a productive misalignment. In order to do so I have employed a selective focus on 
bifurcations and degrees of irreversibility grounded in specific material-semiotic and socio-
technical practices: simplification, experimentation and visualization. They each are related to 
some model formats more than to others and they interlock at specific moments.  
Simplification is on the one hand an aesthetic modeling principle and on the other hand a nec-
essary outcome of aligning model formats that do not perfectly correspond to each other in 
experimental, iterative practices of assembling the computational and the mathematical model.  
Next to being a way of aligning, experimentation is also a way of learning about the model 
through its construction and manipulation. It allows the model to serve as an epistemic tool or 
rather, each slightly different materialized model format as a slightly different epistemic tool. 
Visualization plays a double role as practice and model format. As a practice, it makes strong 
misalignments visible, e.g. between mental and computational models through plots of implau-
sible model output, as well as processes within the model, e.g. effects of different parameter 
settings. As a format, together with illustrative narratives, visualizations are used to stand in for 
“the model” to others unfamiliar with the model and modeling in general to varying degrees. 
In developing that argument I accentuated specific bifurcations: The decision between using an 
existing model and developing a new one, the choice of literature and the willingness to engage 
with literature outside of physics, more minute iterative bifurcations in aligning computational 
and mathematical models, the choice of programming language, and finally the selection of 
visualizations as stand-in for the model in presentations and publications. 
Identifying all possible bifurcations and classifying them after degrees of irreversibility would 
have been beyond the scope of this project, but I was able to develop a basic understanding of 
modeling practices, which was my main goal. In giving a detailed and empirically grounded 
account of modeling practices in a specific setting I operationalized several concepts such as 
bifurcation, degree of irreversibility and alignment while at the same time situating this thesis 
in various theoretical approaches and debates in STS, philosophy and anthropology: collectivity 
in scientific practice, epistemology of computer simulations, materiality in experiments, labor-
atory studies, assumptions and ontology. 
Finally, I turned to the subject matter of the models and developed and problematized uses of 
“the social” and “ecology” as separate spheres as the ongoing efficacy of the nature-culture 
divide alongside the need to demarcate additional spheres of “the hybrid”. In contrasting this 
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with another ontological sketch (Bayesian Anthropology) I suggested an alternative framing of 
these ontological assumptions and the resulting problems. In the terminology of this work, on-
tological assumptions are bifurcations determining the modeling process and “socializing” 
models before it has even begun. In order to come to terms with hybrid, socio-ecological pro-
cesses as they become more and more pressing in the Anthropocene, it is necessary to question 
these assumptions as well. 
Over the course of the last 60 pages I have already elaborated on related issues and hypotheses 
that merit further consideration to some extent. First of all, it is necessary to break down each 
practice of alignment into further practices, especially simplification. A comparative approach 
including other research groups might be fruitful in this context. Also, mirroring and completing 
this work, an account of continuities and reversibility in modeling is needed. An operationali-
zation of Bayesian Anthropology and the next steps of a potentially interdisciplinary or co-
laborative research program should follow at the point where I ended my final part, with par-
ticular reference to the socio-ecological content of models. Additionally, more inquiry is needed 
into a potential non-anthropocentric account of epistemology in modeling here that brings into 
being such hybrid figures like the model-modeler, as I was only able to begin it here. Finally, 
the role of experience and skill in modeling should be considered more extensively as well as 
how the models as epistemic tools function in other contexts, e.g. policy, and together with 
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